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1. Introduction 
The complex and adaptive nature of financial systems imposes challenges to prudential 
supervision demanding a more holistic and flexible policy.
1
 In addition to the regulation of 
individual institutions through microprudential supervision, a macroprudential focus on system-
wide risks is essential. In the vein of Borio (2003), a macroprudential approach is concerned with 
the analysis of systemic risk along the cyclical and structural dimensions, where the former 
relates to the build-up of widespread imbalances and subsequent unraveling in times of crisis and 
the latter to the distribution of risks and shocks’ transmission across the system. Adaptive 
supervision of systemic risk must be sensitive to potentially rapid transformations of the 
financial sector, as is indicated in Fig. 1. Suggestions for increased dynamic macroprudential 
policy have been made, for example, by the Bank of England (BoE, 2011) and the IMF (Lim et 
al., 2011). In line with more adjustable and granular regulation in Basel III, adaptive 
macroprudential policy contributes distinct conceptual and practical enhancements to the 
prudential toolbox. This paper supports adaptive policies by providing a structured approach to 
evaluate the information value for measures of systemic conditions. 
 
Insert Fig. 1 about here 
Fig. 1. Change in assets of financial intermediaries in the US, 1952‒2013. 
The fundamental objective of macroprudential policy is to limit the probability and 
severity of systemic failure, i.e. limit systemic risk. Its strategies are often oriented to the 
institution-specific limits and targets that depend on the risk profile of the system and the 
contribution to that profile of each institution. The limits mainly address institutional risk, return, 
and liquidity in the context of submarkets and the overall system (Aikman et al., 2013). For 
example, time-varying targets can include countercyclical buffers, time-varying provisioning, 
and time-varying reserve requirements (Frait and Komárková, 2011). Generally, in the vein of 
Minskian boom-bust cycles (Minsky, 1982), macroprudential policies of disclosure and targets in 
the cyclical dimension attempt to “create built-in mechanisms that attenuate the impact of 
procyclical behavior” (Cukierman, 2011). In the structural dimension, macroprudential policy 
controls the buildup of large systemic imbalances (common exposures) and increases the 
resilience of networks by attenuating risk propagation. Common exposures and connectivity 
among institutions arise particularly through contractual obligations (ECB, 2013; Flood et al., 
2013). It is worth noting that macroprudential tools require forecasts of systemic stress to 
provide time for preparing and implementing policies (Kellermann and Mosch, 2013), as risks 
                                                 
1
 The concept of the economy as an adaptive, complex system was pioneered by Holland (1975, 1988) in his work 
on adaptive nonlinear networks. Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) study financial markets as adaptive belief 
systems. Hommes (2001) extends this approach to markets as nonlinear adaptive evolutionary systems. See 
Arthur (1995) and Farmer and Lo (1999) for an analysis of heterogeneity in financial markets, Hollingsworth et 
al. (2005) for the socio-economic implications of a financial system’s complexity, and Judge (2012) for the 
increasing complexity caused by the fragmentation of financial markets. 
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must be mitigated before they reach tipping points (ECB 2013). These considerations point to the 
variety of information needed to support macroprudential policy. 
Beyond information requirements, the complexity and dynamics of modern financial 
systems further highlight challenges in accessing appropriate and timely measures of the 
system’s structure and its transformation (Alampalli, 2013; Flood et al., 2013). To this end, 
Andersson et al. (2013) assert that “good supervision is analytical, holistic and forward-looking.” 
Multiple measures have recently been developed to assess and analyze system-wide risks in the 
macro-financial environment. These include alternative measures of systemic conditions to 
identify the cyclical dimension continually, as well as institutional and macroeconomic early 
warning indicators of exuberance, excessive changes and misalignments.
2
 Institutional early 
warning indicators are grounded in capacities to lead the recognition of institutional imbalances 
and result in a structural framework for monitoring the buildup of macroeconomic stresses (Oet 
et al., 2013). Macroeconomic early warning indicators are grounded in capacities to lead the 
recognition of systemic crises and germinate a common cyclical framework for evaluating 
policymaker’s loss function (Alessi and Detken, 2011; Sarlin, 2013). Yet, little or no work has 
focused on the comparative information quality of the coincident measures of systemic 
conditions. To this end, we put forward and apply a methodology to assess the quality of 
information provided by these measures. 
Determining the information value for the coincident measures of systemic conditions is 
critical for several reasons. First, the systemic risk literature has provided a wide array of 
alternative approaches to gauge systemic conditions. However, there is no agreement on one 
measurement approach above others. Second, the existence of an evaluation framework is 
essential for these measures as, in contrast to macroeconomic early warning indicators, they are 
not calibrated to rare crises. Finally, the framework to assess comparatively the measures’ 
information value forms the basis for monitoring and forecasting financial instability at several 
horizons. 
The first part of this paper provides a general-purpose evaluation framework for assessing 
the information value for measures of systemic conditions (Section 2). The framework relies on 
previous work in the early warning literature and extends it by provision of new performance 
measures. The following part applies the framework in an empirical assessment of the 
information value of several coincident measures for the US (Section 3 and 4). We explore the 
relative performance of a large palette of measures both in terms of coincident signaling quality 
and early warning performance. This analysis is completed at multiple frequencies to verify the 
robustness of signaling. Section 5 concludes with a brief discussion of the applications of this 
study. 
                                                 
2
 Overviews are given by Davis and Karim (2008), Gramlich et al. (2010), Kliesen et al. (2012), Babecký et al. 
(2013), and Holopainen and Sarlin (2015). 
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2. A framework for evaluating coincident measures of systemic conditions 
This section presents the framework that is used to evaluate coincident systemic condition 
measures. The methodology includes performance tests for a standard two-class classification 
task as well as time-series methods for forecasting. 
2.1. A contingency matrix and crisis signals 
An immediate concern to policymakers is the issue of whether and when to implement 
macroprudential policy. Policymakers possess a set of instruments through which they can affect 
the financial system in case of crisis. However, these policies are costly to implement when there 
is no crisis. When a crisis occurs, policy is either implemented to the benefit of the system (true 
positive, TP) or not implemented with detrimental effect (false negative, FN). If a crisis does not 
occur, policymakers can implement an unnecessary and potentially burdensome policy (false 
positive, FP) or efficiently abstain from implementing policy (true negative, TN). As pointed out 
in Sarlin (2013), and following the notation of Elkan (2001), we map each of the alternatives to 
costs c, for which we assume that the costs 𝑐𝐹𝑁 and 𝑐𝐹𝑃 are non-negative while 𝑐𝑇𝑃 and 𝑐𝑇𝑁 are 
non-positive costs.
3
 The cost of not implementing policy in times of crisis is 𝑐1 = 𝑐𝐹𝑁 − 𝑐𝑇𝑃, and 
the cost of implementing policy when there is no crisis is 𝑐2 = 𝑐𝐹𝑃 − 𝑐𝑇𝑁 which rolls all costs 
into two terms. Additionally, we denote by 𝑃1 =
𝑇𝑃𝑖+𝐹𝑁𝑖
𝑇𝑃𝑖+𝐹𝑃𝑖+𝐹𝑁𝑖+𝑇𝑁𝑖
 the unconditional probability 
that there is a crisis and 𝑃2 = 1 − 𝑃1 the unconditional probability that no crisis will occur.
4
 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Table 1 
Policymaker’s cost matrix. 
2.2. Evaluating identification properties for systemic condition measures 
To evaluate the performance of systemic condition measures, we need to go beyond 
comparative classification quality obtained through the contingency matrix approach of Table 1 
and consider the value of these measures to support policymakers’ decisions continually. To this 
end we develop a general-purpose evaluation framework for assessing the coincident measures’ 
information quality. 
We begin by noting that the above contingency matrix requires two time series: an ideal 
indicator 𝐵𝐹,𝑡
𝑥  that accurately encodes the occurrence and absence of crisis events (or pre-crisis 
events) and a predictor 𝑆𝐹,𝑖,𝑡
𝑥  that attempts to measure when a crisis (or pre-crisis) is occurring 
based upon which policymakers make their decisions. Therefore, evaluation metrics are essential 
for finding the optimal threshold 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑥  for predictor 𝑖 to generate 𝑆𝐹,𝑖,𝑡
𝑥 . Next, we recognize that 
                                                 
3
 Note that these costs are constant since we are considering the somewhat restrictive case where policymakers 
control the decision to implement policy but may not vary the magnitude of policy. This restriction allows us to 
deal with the two-class classification problem. 
4
  The unconditional probabilities 𝑃1  and 𝑃2 are independent of the stress measure i used by policymakers to decide 
whether or not to implement policy. 
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information content of the coincident measures is relevant to policymakers’ decisions from dual 
perspective 𝑥 of the level of financial system conditions and of the change in these conditions 
since last observation. Thus, the evaluation framework is applied with two perspectives 𝑥 ∈
{𝑙𝑒𝑣, 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓} using several analysis frequencies 𝐹 and multiple stress measures 𝑖. The above 
observations result in a more granular view of the information quality of the coincident 
measures. To this end we quantify the measures’ Noise to Signal Ratio (NTSR), Information 
Value (IV), absolute Usefulness (𝑈𝑎), and relative Usefulness (𝑈𝑅). 
The noise to signal ratio is defined as 𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑅𝑖 =
𝑇2𝑖
(1−𝑇1𝑖)
. In our case, Type I error indicates 
the proportion of crisis observations which are falsely classified as non-crisis (𝑇1𝑖 =
𝐹𝑁𝑖
(𝑇𝑃𝑖+𝐹𝑁𝑖)
=
𝑃(𝑆𝐹,𝑖
𝑥 = 0|𝐵𝐹
𝑥 = 1)), whereas Type II error refers to the proportion of non-crisis periods where a 
crisis was mistakenly signaled (𝑇2𝑖 =
𝐹𝑃𝑖
𝐹𝑃𝑖+𝑇𝑁𝑖
= 𝑃(𝑆𝐹,𝑖
𝑥 = 1|𝐵𝐹
𝑥 = 0)). A noise to signal ratio 
lower than one indicates the measure is beneficial, and Kaminsky et al. (1998) select the 
thresholds for each indicator in their study (𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑙𝑒𝑣, and 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
) to minimize NTSR. Unfortunately, 
since there are typically far more observations classified as “non-crisis” than “crisis” the NTSR 
can often be reduced to zero by setting the threshold for a stress measure conservatively high so 
that 𝐹𝑃𝑖 is zero while maintaining 𝑇𝑃𝑖 greater than zero. 
The IV has been proposed when choosing between several regressors (see Siddiqi, 2006; 
Hababou et al., 2006; Lin, 2013). To calculate this measure we first determine whether the signal 
generated by our regressor was the same as that of the ideal indicator. Next we sort our data set 
by the regressor and group it into 𝑘 bins delimited by the 𝑘 − 1 quantiles of series i, allowing us 
to define 
 𝐼𝑉𝑥𝑖 = ∑ (𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑗 − 𝑏𝑎𝑑𝑗) ln (
𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑗
𝑏𝑎𝑑𝑗
)𝑗  (1), 
where goodj (resp. badj) is the fraction of all good (bad) predictions located in bin j. Notice that 
if the regressor contains no relevant information we would expect to see the same proportion of 
good and bad predictions in each bin leading to an information value of zero. Due to the 
definition’s use of the natural logarithm, the absolute value of 𝐼𝑉𝑥 may become very large if 
𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑗 or 𝑏𝑎𝑑𝑗  become close to zero making it a somewhat unstable metric when working with a 
short dataset. We select the number of bins 𝑘 in order to minimize the number of measures for 
which the IV becomes undefined. Siddiqi (2006) provides a heuristic guide whereby an IV of 
less than 0.1 is weak, IV from 0.1 to 0.3 is average, IV from 0.3 to 0.5 is strong, while IV greater 
than 0.5 may be suspiciously high.  
Selecting the thresholds 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑙𝑒𝑣 and 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
 based on the NTSR may lead to higher thresholds 
that tend to eliminate Type II error at the expense of Type I error. Unlike the NTSR, IV deviates 
from values near 0.5 (which we consider to be an optimal score); excessive Type I or Type II 
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errors are penalized leading to an optimal threshold which is potentially less biased.
5
 Thus, the 
thresholds 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑙𝑒𝑣 and 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
 are selected for each data series to minimize the deviation of IV from 
0.5 allowing an unbiased comparison of measures which are individually signaling at their best. 
For 𝑥 ∈ {𝑙𝑒𝑣, 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓} we find 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑥  such that: 
 min𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑥 |𝐼𝑉𝑖 − 0.5|  (2). 
However, the IV and NTSR metrics do not consider the cost of Type I and Type II errors 
which clearly offers an opportunity to improve the evaluation framework. We attempt therefore 
to measure the monetary value of information provided by a stress measure which accounts for 
the costs of policy implementation and the unconditional probability of crisis. The policymaker 
is faced with the two-class problem from decision theory. Traditional metrics when handling this 
class of problems include the Expected Value Under Uncertainty (EVUU), the Expected Value 
of Perfect Prediction (EVPP), and the Expected Value of Perfect Information given by: 
 𝐸𝑉𝑈𝑈 = −min (𝑃1𝑐𝐹𝑁 + 𝑃2𝑐𝑇𝑁 , 𝑃1𝑐𝑇𝑃 + 𝑃2𝑐𝐹𝑃) (3), 
 𝐸𝑉𝑃𝑃 = −(𝑃1𝑐𝑇𝑃 + 𝑃2𝑐𝑇𝑁) (4), 
 𝐸𝑉𝑃𝐼 = 𝐸𝑉𝑃𝑃 − 𝐸𝑉𝑈𝑈 = −(𝑃1𝑐𝑇𝑃 + 𝑃2𝑐𝑇𝑁) − (− min(𝑃1𝑐𝐹𝑁 + 𝑃2𝑐𝑇𝑁, 𝑃1𝑐𝑇𝑃 + 𝑃2𝑐𝐹𝑃)) 
 = min(𝑃1(𝑐𝐹𝑁 − 𝑐𝑇𝑃), 𝑃2(𝑐𝐹𝑃 − 𝑐𝑇𝑁)) = min(𝑃1𝑐1, 𝑃2𝑐2) 
 = (𝑐1 + 𝑐2) min(𝑃1𝜇, 𝑃2(1 − 𝜇)) (5), 
where 𝜇 =
𝑐1
𝑐1+𝑐2
 represents the fraction of total costs incurred when the policymaker does not 
implement policy and a crisis occurs. If we wanted to calculate the Expected Value of Sample 
Information EVSI (also often called the value of imperfect information or VII) for a measure 
generating signals of crisis imperfectly, then we would first compute the Expected Value of the 
Sample Prediction (EVSP) as: 
 𝐸𝑉𝑆𝑃 =
𝑇𝑃𝑖+𝐹𝑃𝑖
𝑇𝑃𝑖+𝐹𝑃𝑖+𝐹𝑁𝑖+𝑇𝑁𝑖
∗ (−
1
𝑇𝑃𝑖+𝐹𝑃𝑖
) min(𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁𝑖𝑐𝐹𝑁 , 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑐𝐹𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁𝑖𝑐𝑇𝑁) 
 +
𝑇𝑃𝑖+𝐹𝑃𝑖
𝑇𝑃𝑖+𝐹𝑃𝑖+𝐹𝑁𝑖+𝑇𝑁𝑖
∗ (−
1
𝐹𝑁𝑖+𝑇𝑁𝑖
) min (𝐹𝑁𝑖𝑐𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁𝑖𝑐𝐹𝑃, 𝐹𝑁𝑖𝑐𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑁𝑖𝑐𝑇𝑁) (6). 
Then 𝐸𝑉𝑆𝐼 is equal to 𝐸𝑉𝑆𝑃 minus 𝐸𝑉𝑈𝑈 which does not simplify conveniently. If we 
assume that the policies and their effectiveness are fixed and exogenous, then there are too many 
parameters to intuitively consider EVSI when evaluating crisis measures. However, if we were 
able to estimate 𝑐𝑇𝑃, 𝑐𝐹𝑃, 𝑐𝐹𝑁 , and 𝑐𝑇𝑁, then the formula for EVSI would simplify dramatically 
leaving us only with the choice of thresholds. As a straightforward implementation of decision 
theory which accounts for the costs of FN compared to FP and their probabilities, EVSI can 
efficiently differentiate between alternative stress measures. 
In the absence of specific information about the potential costs and benefits of 
implementing policy, Sarlin (2013) defines the absolute and relative Usefulness of predictor i 
according to: 
                                                 
5
 The relationship of the signaling threshold to the NTSR and IV metrics is somewhat erratic and while the 
tendencies outlined above hold true for the majority of this paper’s empirical analysis, they are not guaranteed to 
hold for alternative datasets. 
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 𝑈𝑎(𝜇) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑃1𝜇, 𝑃2(1 − 𝜇)) − 𝐿(𝜇) (7), 
 𝑈𝑅(𝜇) =
𝑈𝑎(𝜇)
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑃1𝜇,𝑃2(1−𝜇))
 (8), 
 𝐿(𝜇) = 𝜇𝑇1𝑃1 + (1 − 𝜇)𝑇2𝑃2 (9), 
where 𝐿(𝜇) represents the policymaker’s loss function. Note that the first term in equation (7) is 
proportional to the expected value of perfect information. This construction then works on the 
idea that superior predictors allow policymakers to minimize 𝐿(𝜇) in which case 𝑈𝑎(𝜇) will 
approach 
1
(𝑐1+𝑐2)
𝐸𝑉𝑃𝐼. Also note that by selecting the signaling thresholds 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑙𝑒𝑣 and 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
to 
optimize 𝑈𝑎(𝜇) for varying 𝜇 we do not determine which predictors are most valuable depending 
on policymakers risk preference 𝜇. Instead we determine which predictors have value for 
differing relative cost of Type I error versus Type II error, while assuming that the policy maker 
is risk neutral.
6
 As an alternative to the method described in equation (2) we therefore select the 
signaling thresholds 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑙𝑒𝑣 and 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
 and the value of 𝜇𝑖 in order to maximize the absolute 
Usefulness (or equivalently the relative Usefulness): 
 max𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑥 ,𝜇𝑖
𝑈𝑅(𝜇𝑖) (10). 
2.3. Evaluating early warning properties for coincident systemic measures 
Several authors employ parts of the above methodology to determine whether individual 
measures consistently lead the benchmark as predictors of crisis, allowing time for policy to be 
implemented (see Kaminsky et al., 1998; Edison, 2003; Lo Duca and Peltonen, 2013). Most of 
these focus on the identification of periods in a predefined window prior to crisis events. By 
contrast, the measures under consideration in this study are designed to assess contemporaneous 
systemic conditions. While good coincident measures can provide useful information for the 
purpose of disclosure, limits, and targets of macroprudential policies, they may provide 
policymakers insufficient time to deploy slower policy instruments. Therefore, beyond testing 
the power of these measures to identify contemporaneous conditions, it is important to determine 
whether they possess a structure which is conducive to an early warning of adverse systemic 
developments. Namely, using only a collection of coincident measures, would a supervisor be 
capable of producing accurate near-term forecasts of systemic conditions? Naturally, any 
coincident measures that possess the relevant structure have enhanced quality to policymakers 
for the conduct of macroprudential policy. Therefore, the second aspect of the proposed 
                                                 
6
 It is interesting to note that when defining the policymaker’s loss function, 𝜇 has been called the “relative 
preference of policymakers between FNs and FPs” (Lo Duca and Peltonen, 2013), the “policy maker’s relative 
risk aversion between type I and type II errors” (Alessi and Detken, 2011), and “the decision-maker’s degree of 
risk-aversion towards missing a crisis” (Fuertes and Kalotychou, 2007). Each of these terminologies seem to 
imply that this parameter captures the risk aversion of the policy maker’s utility function. However, 𝜇 is only a 
measure of relative cost and relies on the assumption that the policy maker is inherently risk neutral. To account 
for the risk aversion of policymakers we could replace 𝑐𝑇𝑃 , 𝑐𝐹𝑃 , 𝑐𝐹𝑁 , and 𝑐𝑇𝑁by 𝑐𝑇𝑃
𝑈 , 𝑐𝐹𝑃
𝑈 , 𝑐𝐹𝑁
𝑈 , and 𝑐𝑇𝑁
𝑈  where 
𝑐𝑥
𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑐𝑥|𝜌) for all 𝑥 ∈ {𝑇𝑃, 𝐹𝑃, 𝐹𝑁, 𝑇𝑁} and 𝑈(𝑐|𝜌) is a utility function appropriate for policymakers with 
risk aversion 𝜌. 
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evaluation framework considers the cyclical properties of coincident measures investigated by 
means of time series analysis. 
We begin with an exploration of the autoregressive properties of individual stress 
measures using the Box-Jenkins (1970) methodology. For each stress measure we test several 
variations of the ARIMA(p,d,q) model, given by equation (11). We also test for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, and where appropriate we implement the GARCH(p,q) methodology to 
account for this aspect of the data. The final model is selected based on properties of the 
residuals (stationarity, heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and partial autocorrelation), the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC), and the Schwarz criterion (SC). We define the difference 
operator Δ𝑑 such that Δ𝑑𝑥𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡−1 is the time series 𝑥𝑡 differenced 𝑑 times and consider 𝑎, 𝑏𝑖, 
and 𝑐𝑖 constants: 
 Δ𝑑𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎 + ∑ 𝑏𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 Δ
𝑑𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑐𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=1 𝜖𝑖,𝑡−1 (11). 
We are also interested in the question of whether the stress measures collectively provide 
beneficial insight into the development of stress. We apply the Johansen (1995) method to test 
the properties of our data and select a VAR or VEC model following equations (12) or (13) 
respectively. We attempt to discern whether the assorted perspectives of financial system 
conditions provided by individual measures allow insight into a mechanism for the development 
of critical systemic episodes.
 7
 
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐 + ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑌𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1  + 𝜖𝑡 (12), 
 Δ𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴(𝐵𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑐) + ∑ 𝐵𝑖Δ𝑌𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1  + 𝜖𝑡 (13). 
Applying this methodology to a collection of coincident measures 𝑦𝑖,𝑡, where 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, 
we define 𝑌𝑡 as the 𝑛 × 1 vector of coincident measures, c is an 𝑛 × 1 constant vector, and 𝐴, 𝐴𝑖, 
𝐵, and 𝐵𝑖 are 𝑛 × 𝑛 matrices where 𝑘 is the number of lags considered for each stress measure. 
The number of lagged terms to incorporate is determined through consideration of the AIC, and 
the SC. 
3. Data for empirical assessment 
In this section, we describe the dataset used in the empirical assessment of the 
information value for alternative measures of US systemic conditions. We describe two types of 
data: first, a constructed representation 𝐵𝐹,𝑡
𝑥  of the ideal indicator, and second, the set of 
coincident measures. 
3.1. A benchmark index of financial stress 
To evaluate coincident measures, we need to ground the comparison to truth. The 
contingency matrix shown in Table 1 requires not only a predictor 𝑆𝐹,𝑖,𝑡
𝑥  that attempts to measure 
when a crisis occurs, but also an ideal indicator of truth 𝐵𝐹,𝑡
𝑥  that accurately encodes the 
occurrence and absence of crisis events. Unfortunately, one single, widely accepted “true” series 
for the occurrence of financial crises does not exist. When determining a crisis benchmark, the 
                                                 
7
 The results are available from the authors upon request. 
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literature has used two approaches to define events: information on direct distress in the system 
and government interventions, and thresholds on market-based stress indexes. An example of the 
former type of events is the database of currency, debt and banking crises by Laeven and 
Valencia (2013), whereas Kaminsky et al. (1998) and Lo Duca and Peltonen (2013) are two 
examples of market-based indexes. Kaminsky et al. (1998) define currency crises to occur when 
their market-pressure index exceeds its mean with more than three standard deviations. Lo Duca 
and Peltonen (2013) identify systemic events when their financial stress index is above the 90
th
 
country-specific percentile. 
In contrast to these studies we proxy the ideal indicator by a composite benchmark to 
reflect the US diverse financial system and to capture a multi-dimensional crisis.
8
 To this end, 
the benchmark design proxies the ideal indicator by sensitizing our construction to three 
behavioral characteristics of actual crises: severity of the system’s state, persistence over time, 
and pervasiveness across components of the system. Accordingly, the benchmark is calculated 
using six volatility series to broadly capture critical disturbances in the US markets for equity 
(through the Chicago Board Options Exchange VIX), foreign exchange (through JPMorgan 
Chase JPMVXYGL), interbank (through Merrill Lynch’s MOVE), credit (through 
MLCORVOL), securitization (through SECURX), and real estate (through REALX)
9
 markets. 
We use the following systematic approach to assessing threshold exceedances. Under the 
𝑥 ∈ {𝑙𝑒𝑣} perspective, the benchmark is defined to indicate crisis if the imbalance level of a 
volatility series is above threshold 𝜏𝐵,𝐹
𝑙𝑒𝑣 in two consecutive periods or if the imbalance levels of 
two volatility series are above 𝜏𝐵,𝐹
𝑙𝑒𝑣 simultaneously. The alternative 𝑥 ∈ {𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓} perspective 
generates a signal if the difference in the imbalance of a volatility series is above a threshold 
𝜏𝐵,𝐹
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
 in two consecutive periods or if the differences in the imbalances of two volatility series 
are above 𝜏𝐵,𝐹
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
 simultaneously. Formally, we define the imbalance and indicator functions as: 
 𝑖(𝑥𝑖𝑡) =
𝑥𝑖𝑡−𝜇𝑖
𝜎𝑖
 (14), 
 𝐼𝐹
𝑙𝑒𝑣(𝑣𝑖,𝑡) = {
1    𝑖𝑓 𝑖(𝑣𝑖,𝑡) > 𝜏𝐵,𝐹
𝑙𝑒𝑣 
0   𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒                        
 (15), 
 𝐼𝐹
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝑣𝑖,𝑡) = {
1    𝑖𝑓 (𝑖(𝑣𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑖(𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1)) > 𝜏𝐵,𝐹
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 
0   𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒                                                    
 (16); 
then, 𝐵𝐹,𝑡
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = {1    𝑖𝑓 
∑ 𝐼𝐹
𝑙𝑒𝑣(𝑣𝑖,𝑡−𝑖)
𝑘−1
𝑖=0 = 𝑘 𝑜𝑟 ∑ 𝐼𝐹
𝑙𝑒𝑣(𝑣𝑖,𝑡)𝑖 ≥ 𝑙
0    𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒                                                                         
 (17), 
                                                 
8
  The frequently cited banking crisis episode list proposed by Laeven and Valencia (2013) finds only one US 
episode from 1992 to 2013 (the financial crisis starting in 2007). Their definition focusses on systemic banking 
crises and may therefore miss critical disturbances manifesting in the broader financial system and distinct 
markets. 
9
 The MLCORVOL (credit) volatility is generated by calculating 30 day rolling standard deviation of the Merrill 
Lynch MLCORPM yield to redemption data series from Datastream. The SECURX (securitization) volatility 
and REALX (real estate) volatility measures are generated by calculating the rolling 90 day rolling standard 
deviation of the Barclays Asset Backed Securities Index (Datastream LHASSBK) and DOW JONES US Real 
Estate Index (GFD-DJU11) respectively. 
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and, 𝐵𝐹,𝑡
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 = {1    𝑖𝑓 ∑ 𝐼𝐹
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝑣𝑖,𝑡−𝑖)
𝑘−1
𝑖=0 = 𝑘 𝑜𝑟 ∑ 𝐼𝐹
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝑣𝑖,𝑡)𝑖 ≥ 𝑙
0    𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒                                                                              
 (18). 
By monitoring the imbalance in volatility, the level perspective will produce signals 
throughout the crisis if a single market indicator demonstrates persistently high levels (two or 
more consecutive alerts) or if multiple markets are above the threshold simultaneously. In 
addition, monitoring the differences in volatility imbalances will focus on potential developing 
crises with alerts stemming from notable persistent growth in imbalances for at least one market 
or the simultaneous growth of imbalances in at least two markets. However, by design the 
difference methodology will produce signals only at the onset of a crisis and will not allow us to 
determine crisis termination. In summary, construction of the benchmark series 𝐵𝐹,𝑡
𝑥  proxies the 
ideal indicator of truth by capturing a multi-dimensional set of crisis characteristics: severity 
(through 𝜏𝐵,𝐹
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
 and 𝜏𝐵,𝐹
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
), persistence (𝑘 = 2 periods), and pervasiveness (𝑙 = 2 markets). 
The benchmark thresholds 𝜏𝐵,𝐹
𝑙𝑒𝑣 and 𝜏𝐵,𝐹
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
 used in equations (14)-(18) are selected such 
that approximately 20% of observations indicate crisis.
10
 Alternatives using multivariate logistic 
regression could also be used under similar considerations. Clearly, the benchmark design 
described above will not perfectly indicate the presence and absence of system-wide crisis; 
however, the degree to which several distinct characteristics align proxies the ideal indicator both 
experientially (by describing relevant critical systemic episodes) and metrically (by supporting 
the benchmark’s convergent validity). The benchmark is compared to several published 
coincident measures in Fig. 2 under both 𝑥 ∈ {𝑙𝑒𝑣, 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓} perspectives. 
 
Insert Fig. 2 about here 
Fig. 2. Benchmark compared to several stress series. 
3.2. Systemic financial stress measures 
Our dataset includes 23 published measures of contemporaneous US financial conditions, 
stress, risk, and system structure (not all measures are available for comparison at every 
frequency). To make use of the contingency matrix for evaluating coincident measures, we must 
also determine when each measure indicates that policy should be implemented, that is when 
they signal a crisis. Therefore, we propose a scheme parallel to that developed for the 
benchmark. Each measure is converted to an imbalance by subtracting the mean and dividing by 
the standard deviation.
11
 Crisis signals are then generated for each series where crisis is indicated 
                                                 
10
 The benchmark threshold was set low in order to allow markets to signal due to modest pressure. However, the 
requirement that a single market experience stress in consecutive periods, or at least two markets experience 
stress simultaneously, mitigates the impact of a low threshold and increases the likelihood of the benchmark 
revealing systemic events. 
11
 Several series are designed to reflect the conditions of the financial system or economy so that a negative 
imbalance may be interpreted as positive stress, requiring inversion of the series about its mean to ensure 
consistent comparison of crisis signals. 
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if the imbalance (or the differenced imbalance) is greater than the threshold 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑙𝑒𝑣 (respectively 
𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
), specifically: 
 𝑆𝐹,𝑖,𝑡
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = {
1   𝑖𝑓 𝑖(𝑥𝑖,𝑡) > 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑙𝑒𝑣
0    𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒                     
 (19), 
 𝑆𝐹,𝑖,𝑡
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 = {1   𝑖𝑓 𝑖(𝑥𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑖(𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1) > 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
0    𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒                                             
 (20). 
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy (KMO MSA) was also calculated to determine whether these series would be 
conducive to factor analysis following equation (21) where 𝑟𝑗𝑘
2  the correlations and 𝑝𝑗𝑘
2  are the 
partial correlations between j and k. According to Kaiser (1970) a MSA above 0.8 is very good, 
between 0.6 and 0.8 is middling, and below 0.6 is poor. The KMO MSA for the specified 
variables (excluding the components of CFSI to eliminate multicollinearity) was computed as 
0.842 indicating very good cohesion of the concepts captured by these measures (significant at 
1%): 
 𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑗 =
∑ 𝑟𝑗𝑘
2
𝑘≠𝑗
∑ 𝑟𝑗𝑘
2
𝑘≠𝑗 +∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑘
2
𝑘≠𝑗 
   (21). 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics. 
The coincident measures considered in this paper focus on several aspects of financial 
system health. The first group of measures focuses on the concept of systemic stress which can 
be defined as relative pressure in the financial system. These indexes—Bloomberg Financial 
Conditions Index (FCI), Goldman Sachs FCI, Cleveland Fed Financial Stress Index (CFSI), 
Kansas City Fed Financial Stress Index (KCFSI), St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index (STLFSI) 
and Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI)—typically incorporate variables 
describing core markets and functions of the financial system which are then aggregated using a 
variety of weighting methodologies. For instance, the CFSI measures systemic stress as the 
credit weighted aggregate of stress in six markets (see Fig. 2). Systemic conditions in these 
markets are assessed on the basis of spreads, normalized using the relative rank, and are 
aggregated using credit weights as a dynamic weighting method (stress adjusts to variations in 
importance of each measure and market to the financial system). Alternately, the Bloomberg FCI 
looks at normalized spreads, equity prices, and equity volatility (VIX) using constant weights to 
determine a measure of the access to credit. Because systemic stress often evolves from 
individual sub-sectors and their correlated behavior, information about the state of stress in the 
systems’ components and their comovement is particularly useful. 
A second group of measures examines the state of gross economic activity—Chicago Fed 
National Activity Index (CFNAI) and Philadelphia’s Leading Index—using transformations of a 
large set of variables. CFNAI looks at several aspects of the economy including personal 
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consumption and housing, employment/unemployment and hours, production and income, 
sales/orders and inventories. The third category of coincident measures included in this study—
SRISK and Kamakura’s Troubled Company Index—reflects the concepts of current expectations 
of systemic risk which are forward-looking by design. For instance, SRISK calculates the 
expected decrease in bank capital under a given set of adverse conditions at the institution level. 
The resulting knowledge about the factors of stress permits much more detail in macroprudential 
communication and also assists when guiding institutions’ risk management functions. 
We analyze the dataset in two samples. The first (main) sample maximizes the available 
breadth of the sample, while the second (robustness) sample seeks to maximize its length. 
Accordingly the main sample (June 2000  December 2013) consists of 23 quarterly, 23 
monthly, 14 weekly, and 10 daily series. The robustness sample (May 1992  December 2013) 
consists of 21 quarterly, 21 monthly, 12 weekly, and 9 daily series and encompasses at least two 
full economic cycles (following the NBER delineation of recession periods),
12
 including several 
well-recognized critical episodes. It has to be agreed that a longer time series provides more 
insight into the cyclical properties of the observed measures. However, the longer sample also 
limits the cross-sectional analysis, as not all indicators are available for a longer period. Our 
sampling strategy balances the trade-off between the number of indicators and the number of 
observations, emphasizing cross-sectional comparisons in the main sample and cyclical 
comparisons in the robustness sample. Importantly, at quarterly and monthly frequencies, the 
composition of both samples includes all three groups of coincident measures. 
4. Results 
This section presents evaluation results from the empirical assessment of alternative US 
coincident measures in the main sample. The section consists of two parts: the first part tests the 
coincident efficacy for measures of systemic conditions and the second part tests the early 
warning effectiveness of the measures. The results of testing the robustness sample are presented 
in Tables A.1–A.4 in the Appendix. As shown, the robustness sample results are generally 
consistent with main findings. 
4.1. Efficacy of systemic condition measures 
Tables 3 and 4 report the comparative signaling results for the tested coincident measures 
where thresholds 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑙𝑒𝑣 and 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
 are selected to optimize the information value metric IV 
following equation (2). As these tables should display measures with comparable IV metrics by 
design, we will evaluate the comparative advantage of these measures in terms of the Type I (T1) 
error rate, Type II (T2) error rate, NTSR, and Usefulness metrics. 
Table 3 displays comparative metrics when signals of crisis are based upon the level of 
imbalances in the volatility and stress time series. Almost every measure of stress produces a 
NTSR below unity at every frequency indicating varying degrees of benefit from their use. 
                                                 
12  
See http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html.
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Additionally, the usefulness of most series (captured by 𝑈𝑅(𝜇)) is maximized when the relative 
cost of Type I versus Type II error to risk neutral policymakers is given by 𝜇 = 0.7, that is, Type 
I error is more costly than Type II error. This is advantageous since it indicates that the measures 
included in this study are in large part conducive to policymaker’s needs. Typically it is assumed 
that the cost of not implementing policy in the case of crisis outstrips the cost of implementing 
policy in the case of no crisis. This is also in line with previous findings on relative costs 
between errors (Sarlin, 2013; Betz et al., 2014). These results indicate that the 6 sector CFSI, the 
Goldman Sachs FCI, and STLFSI consistently produce the highest Usefulness metrics and very 
low NTSRs. The CFSI produces a lower Type I error rate than the Goldman Sachs FCI at the 
cost of a slight increase in the Type II error rate. SRISK and Philadelphia’s Leading Index also 
demonstrate fairly steady and attractive metrics. Although the Usefulness and NTSR for KCFSI, 
NFCI, and CFNAI 3-month moving average are attractive (particularly at monthly frequency), 
they exhibit excessively high (or low) IV. Additionally, it is interesting to note that CFSI and 
CFNAI, for which the components are also available, modestly outperform their components. 
This is a welcome observation, as it provides additional support for their composite 
methodologies and is consistent with the financial system’s property of hierarchical composition 
and decomposability (Simon, 1962). 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Table 3 
IV based results. 
When we analyze the differenced imbalances in an effort to focus on the onset of crises 
instead of their duration, Table 4 indicates substantially different results in terms of the 
comparative advantage of each measure. STLFSI, NFCI, Bloomberg FCI, SRISK, and CFSI 
each demonstrate attractive NTSR and Usefulness metrics at assorted frequencies, however there 
is no clear leader. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Table 4 
IV based results. 
If we determine 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑙𝑒𝑣 based upon maximization of the Usefulness following equation (10), 
we can note based upon Tables 5 and 6 that the NTSR is quite low, and more interestingly there 
appears to be a fairly clear divide between measures with strong IV metrics and those with weak 
IV metrics. The clear leaders using this methodology in Table 5 are CFSI and STLFSI, which 
consistently achieve high Usefulness metrics and low NTSR. At monthly and weekly frequency 
both produce strong IV, but at quarterly frequency STLFSI has a middling Usefulness and the IV 
is undefined. Philadelphia’s Leading Index, NFCI, Goldman Sachs FCI, and Bloomberg FCI also 
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have attractive IV and NTSR. However, they produce somewhat lower Usefulness metrics due to 
their balance of Type I and Type II errors. 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
Table 5 
Usefulness based results. 
Interestingly, determining 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
 based upon equation (10) produces a collection of 
measures with little stability across frequencies, as is shown in Table 6. At quarterly frequency 
many measures (Bloomberg FCI, Goldman Sachs FCI, CFSI, and the CFNAI) possess attractive 
Usefulness measures and good NTSR, albeit accompanied by somewhat large variation in IVs. 
STLFSI, NFCI, and the CFNAI diffusion index do achieve a good balance of all three metrics. 
At other frequencies Goldman Sachs FCI, KCFSI, SRISK, and CFSI produce attractive 
Usefulness metrics with acceptable NTSR, but the IV results tend to diverge from the desired 
0.4-0.6 range. Bloomberg FCI achieves good metrics at every frequency hindered only with high 
(low) IV at quarterly (weekly) frequencies.
13
 
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
Table 6 
Usefulness based results. 
4.2. Early warning effectiveness of coincident systemic measures 
The set of experiments herein focus on early warning properties of the US coincident 
systemic measures. To apply the Box-Jenkins methodology, we begin by differencing the 
standardized coincident measures to achieve weak form stationarity. Once this is achieved we 
often find that based upon autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation evidence there is no 
support for an autoregressive or moving average structure in the data. These results appear to 
support the idea that systemic conditions, as viewed by these measures individually, display 
characteristics of random walk over the period 2002M01 to 2007M06, and thus we omit the 
estimation results. 
We also pursue an atheoretical examination of the potential for a process through which 
financial conditions perceived by a collection of measures may develop into stress observed by 
another set of measures. The cointegrated VEC forecasts are presented visually in Figure 3 using 
an initial estimation sample from 1992M05 to 2004M01. The forecast is effected by estimating 
                                                 
13
 When generating the benchmark, each volatility series is converted into an imbalance which adjusts the location 
and scale parameters of its distribution but will not remedy skewness or kurtosis differences between volatility 
indices. As a result, if the distribution for the VIX time-series data exhibits fat tails compared to the other 
volatility benchmarks it may generate a disproportionate number of signals compared to the other volatility 
indices. This may explain why stress measures that include VIX demonstrate a modestly improved ability to 
locate observations of crisis. 
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the parameters using all observable data and calculating the forecast one period ahead repeatedly 
between 2004M02 and 2013M12. 
 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
Figure 3 
VEC forecast results. 
A comparison of the forecast accuracy from out-of-sample forecasts is available in Table 
7, sorted by mean absolute percentage error (MAPE). Here NFCI provides the best absolute out-
of-sample fit, while Bloomberg FCI exhibits the worst fit. From these forecasts we generate 
signals of crisis (using thresholds for each measure which maximize the in-sample Usefulness 
metric) to see if there is a significant difference between in-sample and out-of-sample Usefulness 
(Table 8). The estimation and forecasting samples were selected to provide sufficient data for 
lagged regression; so that the forecast timeframe would include observations where the 
benchmark generated signals of both crisis and no crisis (allowing forecasts to produce both 
Type I and Type II errors). 
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
Table 7 
Forecast accuracy. 
The Usefulness metric used to evaluate the forecasts is sensitive to the chosen in-sample 
and out-of-sample intervals, since without the opportunity to compare a forecast against both 
crisis and tranquil observations the Usefulness metric will have a maximum of zero. By 
definition, forecasts with a uniform prediction of crisis or no crisis have a maximum Usefulness 
of zero. We find the Usefulness, IV, and NTSR do no exhibit a great deal of persistence between 
in-sample and out-of-sample results. Interestingly, KCFSI and NFCI perform much better out-of-
sample than in-sample, while Bloomberg FCI, CFNAI, and the Philadelphia’s Leading Index all 
perform worse out-of-sample. Only three of the tested measures: Kamakura’s Troubled 
Company Index, CFSI, and Goldman Sachs FCI demonstrate modestly stable Usefulness metrics 
over time. 
 
Insert Table 8 about here 
Table 8 
Usefulness of in sample data compared to out of sample forecasts. 
5. Conclusion 
To be conducive to macroprudential policy in adaptive financial markets, coincident 
measures must support the identification, analysis and early warning of systemic risk conditions. 
They must reveal in timely manner information concerning the aggregation of exposures from 
individual firms or markets to the system level. Thus, the ability of decomposable coincident 
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measures to reflect the hierarchical composition of the system (Simon, 1962) is inherently useful 
for understanding the system and its critical modes. Decomposable coincident measures tend to 
have enhanced information value by reflecting conditions in a variety of aspects of the financial 
system. Further, coincident measures must be constructed with the ability to remain informative 
across time despite changes in the financial system, so that they can be used to analyze past 
trends, monitor the financial system, and serve as dependent variables in studies of financial 
instability. 
This paper analyzes several metrics used to compare coincident measures of systemic 
conditions to a benchmark representing the presence of crisis, alongside the methodology used to 
generate signals. Concerning the choice between signaling the presence or absence of a crisis on 
the basis of the level of imbalances as opposed to the growth in imbalances, we note that 
defining thresholds in terms of imbalance levels advantageously produces much more stable 
information value, NTSR, and Usefulness metrics across frequencies. Analyzing the level of 
systemic conditions also allows a direct study of the beginning and end of each episode, an 
objective not attained by the difference perspective. With respect to the particular metrics used to 
compare coincident measures and determine thresholds we find that the Usefulness metric 
possesses several suitable properties. The Usefulness metric has a straightforward scale for 
which higher Usefulness is better (superior to the heuristic scale of IV), is stable across all 
selections of 𝜇 ∈ (0,1) (unlike the stability of IV which depends on the number of bins or NTSR 
which depends on the particular balance of Type I and Type II error rates), and it incorporates 
the necessary and intuitive aspect of policy cost versus benefit represented by the preference 
parameter 𝜇. Usefulness should not be considered by itself, but it remains a convenient and 
accessible metric to use for introductory comparison. The balance between Type I and Type II 
error rates captured by the NTSR, the dispersion of good versus bad predictions in each quantile, 
and the raw Type I and Type II error rates each display distinct and beneficial insight into the 
quality of information provided by coincident measures. Empirical evaluation utilizing the 
imbalance level perspective and selecting thresholds that maximize the Usefulness metric 
(presented in Table 5) reveals that several measures exhibit consistently attractive properties, 
with CFSI leading across all analysis frequencies. 
Policymakers rely on the ability to project systemic conditions to enable implementation 
of policies which take time to affect the financial system. Our analysis of US coincident 
measures using the Box-Jenkins ARIMA methodology indicates that they do not (after necessary 
transformation) possess sufficient structure individually. As an alternative, the VEC 
methodology is used with mixed results on a longer sample to determine whether there is a 
process through which observations of systemic conditions allow insight into a mechanism for 
the development of critical systemic episodes. On one hand, the results show significant 
cointegration which indicates that there are long run relationships between several of the 
coincident measures. In addition, some of the forecasts exhibit moderately stable positive 
Usefulness out-of-sample, which is attractive to policymakers. On the other hand, the one period 
 Page 17 of 32 
forecasts radically limit the application for policy implementation. This is a topic that requires 
further study using methods capable of producing robust, dynamic, and actionable forecasts. 
A basic problem in identifying and analyzing systemic risk is that it may arise from 
patterns “for which we have no precedent” (Judge 2012). This is particularly relevant for 
adaptive markets. Alternatively, assessing systemic risk on the basis of a policymaker’s own 
considerations and scenarios may lead to unrealistic assumptions. A particular challenge in 
applying early warning projections for macroprudential policy is that the policy itself leads to 
feedbacks and adverse or unanticipated dynamics. This further amplification of the system’s 
adaptive response to macroprudential policy must be considered a major challenge of the policy 
itself. A further question, therefore, is to what extent policy should restrict itself to ex-post 
responses to the transformation of markets or direct itself ex-ante to control the sensitivity of the 
system’s adaptation. 
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Figures and Tables 
Fig. 1. Percentage of total financial assets held by each financial sector: 1952-2013. 
 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2014.  
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Fig. 2. Several coincident measures of systemic conditions (CFSI, SRISK, STLFSI, NFCI) at 
weekly frequency with the benchmark for crisis shaded (𝜏𝐵,𝐹
𝑙𝑒𝑣 on the left, 𝜏𝐵,𝐹
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓
on the right). 
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Fig. 3. VEC forecast results. 
  
  
  
  
Note: Forecast—red dashed line; realized systemic conditions—solid blue line. 
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Table 1 
Policymaker’s cost matrix. 
 Benchmark indicates crisis (𝐵𝐹 = 1) Benchmark indicates no crisis (𝐵𝐹 = 0) 
Signal is produced (𝑆𝐹,𝑖 = 1) True Positive (𝑇𝑃𝑖): cost 𝑐𝑇𝑃  False Positive (𝐹𝑃𝑖): cost 𝑐𝐹𝑃 
No signal is produced (𝑆𝐹,𝑖 = 0) False Negative (𝐹𝑁𝑖): cost 𝑐𝐹𝑁 True Positive (𝑇𝑁𝑖): cost 𝑐𝑇𝑁 
 
 
Table 2 
Summary statistics for the stress series and benchmark volatility series calculated on quarterly 
data between 2002Q1 and 2013Q4. 
Name Code Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Panel 1: Systemic Stress Series        
6 SECTOR CFSI CFSI 32.46 82.24 49.26 13.20 0.93 -0.06 
CREDIT MARKET FROM CFSI CREDIT 2.04 14.51 5.64 2.87 1.50 2.09 
RE MARKET FROM CFSI REAL_ESTATE 4.15 27.08 15.28 6.37 0.25 -1.04 
FUNDING MARKET FROM CFSI INTERBANK 3.66 13.18 8.43 2.24 -0.09 0.02 
EQUITY MARKET FROM CFSI EQUITY 0.42 8.90 3.89 2.55 0.49 -1.06 
FX MARKET FROM CFSI FOREIGN_EXCHANGE 2.73 10.61 6.32 2.01 0.23 -0.55 
SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM CFSI SECURITIZATION 5.25 17.62 9.70 2.99 0.66 0.05 
KANSAS CITY FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX KCFSI -0.91 5.33 0.18 1.24 2.62 7.82 
ST LOUIS FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX STLFSI -1.26 5.24 -0.06 1.23 2.45 7.64 
BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX BFCIUS -8.63 1.09 -0.62 1.72 -2.65 9.61 
Panel 2: Economic Activity Series        
GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX GSERFCI 98.88 102.36 99.89 0.82 1.36 1.71 
NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX - CHICAGO NFCI -0.90 2.70 -0.31 0.70 2.58 7.75 
NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX NFCINONFINLEVERAGE -1.05 3.49 0.04 0.86 2.08 5.11 
NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX NFCILEVERAGE -1.36 2.70 0.27 1.37 0.54 -1.09 
CFNAI: THREE MONTH MOVING AVERAGE CFNAIMA3 -3.73 0.55 -0.31 0.85 -2.61 7.23 
CFNAI: DIFFUSION INDEX CFNAIDIFF -0.84 0.43 -0.08 0.33 -1.07 0.54 
CFNAI: PERSONAL CONSUMPTION AND HOUSING CANDH -0.37 0.13 -0.09 0.17 -0.13 -1.58 
CFNAI: EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND HOURS EUANDH -1.55 0.27 -0.14 0.36 -2.14 5.24 
CFNAI: PRODUCTION AND INCOME PANDI -1.17 0.45 -0.03 0.31 -2.12 4.92 
CFNAI: SALES, ORDERS, AND INVENTORIES SOANDI -0.57 0.15 -0.02 0.14 -2.26 5.61 
PHILADELPHIA'S LEADING INDEX FOR THE US USSLIND -2.77 1.66 0.78 1.03 -2.21 4.93 
Panel  3: Systemic Stress Series        
KAMAKURA'S TROUBLED COMPANY INDEX TC_INDEX 5.13 22.70 10.01 5.32 1.47 0.68 
SRISK FROM VLAB SRISK 53892.81 881827.34 318249.82 244417.27 0.50 -1.00 
Panel 4: Volatility Series        
SECURITIZATION VOLATILITY INDEX SECURX 0.03 0.96 0.21 0.21 2.46 5.75 
MERRILL LYNCH'S MOVE MOVE 56.17 200.50 101.28 32.22 1.07 1.28 
REAL ESTATE VOLATILITY INDEX REALX 0.04 0.46 0.13 0.08 1.58 3.92 
JP MORGAN GLOBAL FX VOLATILITY JPMVXYGL 6.20 21.76 10.60 2.83 1.67 4.49 
MERRILL LYNCH CORPORATE BOND INDEX VOLATILITY MLCORVOL 0.03 0.51 0.12 0.09 2.63 9.56 
CBOE'S VIX VIX 11.40 43.79 20.62 8.45 1.29 1.05 
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Table 3 
Comparison of coincident measures’ ability to signal stress based on the imbalance level and 
optimal IV. 
 
Name 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑙𝑒𝑣 TP FP TN FN T1 T2 IV NTSR µ 𝑈𝐴(𝜇) 𝑈𝑅(𝜇) 
Panel 1: Quarterly    (𝜏𝐵,𝑄
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 1 and 3 bins were used for IV)             
1 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 2 2 0 38 14 0.88 0  0 0.5 0.02 0.13 
2 KANSAS CITY FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 2 2 0 38 14 0.88 0  0 0.5 0.02 0.13 
3 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 2 1 0 38 15 0.94 0  0 0.2 0 0.06 
4 ST LOUIS FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 2 2 0 38 14 0.88 0  0 0.5 0.02 0.13 
5 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 1.83 3 0 38 13 0.81 0 0.77 0 0.2 0.01 0.19 
6 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 1.21 5 1 37 11 0.69 0.03 0.74 0.08 0.7 0.06 0.29 
7 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.73 12 4 34 4 0.25 0.11 0.54 0.14 0.7 0.13 0.64 
8 LEADING INDEX FOR THE US 0.62 6 5 33 10 0.63 0.13 0.52 0.35 0.7 0.05 0.24 
9 CFNAI: THREE MONTH MOVING AVERAGE 1.5 3 1 37 13 0.81 0.03 0.51 0.14 0.7 0.03 0.16 
10 CFNAI: EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND HOURS 1.48 3 1 37 13 0.81 0.03 0.51 0.14 0.7 0.03 0.16 
11 KAMAKURA'S TROUBLED COMPANY INDEX 1.67 4 3 35 12 0.75 0.08 0.48 0.32 0.7 0.04 0.17 
12 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.76 10 3 35 6 0.38 0.08 0.47 0.13 0.7 0.11 0.54 
13 SRISK FROM VLAB 1.17 5 4 34 11 0.69 0.11 0.47 0.34 0.7 0.04 0.21 
14 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.85 10 6 32 6 0.38 0.16 0.46 0.25 0.7 0.1 0.46 
15 CFNAI: DIFFUSION INDEX 1 5 5 33 11 0.69 0.13 0.46 0.42 0.7 0.04 0.18 
16 CFNAI: PERSONAL CONSUMPTION AND HOUSING 2 0 0 38 16 1 0 0.46  0.4 0 0 
17 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.91 2 7 31 14 0.88 0.18 0.44 1.47 0.7 -0.01 -0.06 
18 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.55 5 6 32 11 0.69 0.16 0.36 0.51 0.7 0.03 0.15 
19 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.2 6 1 37 10 0.63 0.03 0.34 0.07 0.7 0.07 0.35 
20 CFNAI: PRODUCTION AND INCOME 0.5 5 6 32 11 0.69 0.16 0.31 0.51 0.7 0.03 0.15 
21 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 2 0 0 38 16 1 0 0.31  0.4 0 0 
22 CFNAI: SALES, ORDERS, AND INVENTORIES 0.71 4 5 33 12 0.75 0.13 0.18 0.53 0.7 0.02 0.12 
23 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 1.58 2 3 35 14 0.88 0.08 0.17 0.63 0.7 0.01 0.04 
Panel 2: Monthly      (𝜏𝐵,𝑀
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 1 and 3 bins were used for IV)             
1 KAMAKURA'S TROUBLED COMPANY INDEX 1.73 10 5 110 38 0.79 0.04 1.58 0.21 0.7 0.03 0.16 
2 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.76 17 4 111 31 0.65 0.03 0.83 0.1 0.7 0.07 0.32 
3 KANSAS CITY FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.71 15 3 112 33 0.69 0.03 0.74 0.08 0.7 0.06 0.29 
4 ST LOUIS FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.59 23 6 109 25 0.52 0.05 0.74 0.11 0.7 0.09 0.43 
5 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.74 28 24 91 20 0.42 0.21 0.72 0.36 0.7 0.08 0.37 
6 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.76 31 10 105 17 0.35 0.09 0.69 0.13 0.7 0.11 0.56 
7 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.06 26 4 111 22 0.46 0.03 0.67 0.06 0.7 0.1 0.51 
8 CFNAI: DIFFUSION INDEX 1.32 14 11 104 34 0.71 0.1 0.52 0.33 0.7 0.04 0.19 
9 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 1.62 12 0 115 36 0.75 0 0.51 0 0.6 0.04 0.25 
10 CFNAI: EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND HOURS 1.95 8 0 115 40 0.83 0 0.5 0 0.3 0.01 0.17 
11 CFNAI: THREE MONTH MOVING AVERAGE 1.58 10 1 114 38 0.79 0.01 0.5 0.04 0.7 0.04 0.2 
12 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.5 34 17 98 14 0.29 0.15 0.49 0.21 0.7 0.11 0.56 
13 LEADING INDEX FOR THE US 1.11 11 6 109 37 0.77 0.05 0.49 0.23 0.7 0.04 0.18 
14 SRISK FROM VLAB 1.11 15 11 104 33 0.69 0.1 0.49 0.31 0.7 0.04 0.21 
15 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.45 4 9 106 44 0.92 0.08 0.49 0.94 0.7 0 0 
16 CFNAI: PERSONAL CONSUMPTION AND HOUSING 0.61 23 28 87 25 0.52 0.24 0.46 0.51 0.7 0.05 0.23 
17 CFNAI: PRODUCTION AND INCOME 0.56 15 25 90 33 0.69 0.22 0.46 0.7 0.7 0.02 0.09 
18 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 2 8 0 115 40 0.83 0 0.44 0 0.3 0.01 0.17 
19 CFNAI: SALES, ORDERS, AND INVENTORIES 0.71 14 19 96 34 0.71 0.17 0.43 0.57 0.7 0.03 0.12 
20 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.5 11 33 82 37 0.77 0.29 0.39 1.25 0.7 -0.01 -0.07 
21 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.5 17 20 95 31 0.65 0.17 0.31 0.49 0.7 0.04 0.18 
22 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.5 18 28 87 30 0.63 0.24 0.25 0.65 0.7 0.03 0.12 
23 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 1.67 8 4 111 40 0.83 0.03 0.11 0.21 0.7 0.03 0.13 
Panel 3: Weekly      (𝜏𝐵,𝑊
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 1.2 and 4 bins were used for IV)             
1 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.5 97 36 491 84 0.46 0.07 1.43 0.13 0.7 0.08 0.45 
2 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.73 118 53 474 63 0.35 0.1 0.99 0.15 0.7 0.09 0.53 
3 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 2 0 0 527 181 1 0 0.87  0.4 0 0 
4 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.14 93 30 497 88 0.49 0.06 0.82 0.11 0.7 0.08 0.44 
5 ST LOUIS FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.64 88 23 504 93 0.51 0.04 0.79 0.09 0.7 0.08 0.43 
6 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 1.18 70 13 514 111 0.61 0.02 0.58 0.06 0.7 0.06 0.36 
7 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.79 106 40 487 75 0.41 0.08 0.54 0.13 0.7 0.09 0.49 
8 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 1.24 58 11 516 123 0.68 0.02 0.5 0.07 0.7 0.05 0.29 
9 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.77 76 87 440 105 0.58 0.17 0.5 0.39 0.7 0.04 0.21 
10 SRISK FROM VLAB 0.88 86 81 446 95 0.52 0.15 0.49 0.32 0.7 0.05 0.28 
11 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 1.55 20 68 459 161 0.89 0.13 0.49 1.17 0.7 -0.01 -0.05 
12 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.88 42 91 436 139 0.77 0.17 0.48 0.74 0.7 0 0.02 
13 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.5 75 74 453 106 0.59 0.14 0.33 0.34 0.7 0.04 0.24 
14 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 1.71 33 14 513 148 0.82 0.03 0.27 0.15 0.7 0.03 0.15 
Panel 4: Daily      (𝜏𝐵,𝐷
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 1.2 and 4 bins were used for IV)             
1 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.5 698 212 3336 715 0.51 0.06 1.16 0.12 0.7 0.09 0.43 
2 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.73 856 361 3187 557 0.39 0.1 0.89 0.17 0.7 0.1 0.5 
3 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1 716 253 3295 697 0.49 0.07 0.76 0.14 0.7 0.09 0.43 
4 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 2 1 0 3548 1412 1 0 0.74 0 0.6 0 0 
5 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 1.27 471 23 3525 942 0.67 0.01 0.59 0.02 0.7 0.07 0.33 
6 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.91 658 178 3370 755 0.53 0.05 0.51 0.11 0.7 0.08 0.41 
7 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.67 584 666 2882 829 0.59 0.19 0.51 0.45 0.7 0.04 0.21 
8 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.85 341 647 2901 1072 0.76 0.18 0.5 0.76 0.7 0.01 0.05 
9 SRISK FROM VLAB 0.5 745 999 2549 668 0.47 0.28 0.49 0.53 0.7 0.04 0.22 
10 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.5 540 511 3037 873 0.62 0.14 0.28 0.38 0.7 0.05 0.23 
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Table 4 
Comparison of financial stress indices’ ability to signal stress based on the differenced imbalance 
and optimal IV. 
 
Name 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑙𝑒𝑣 TP FP TN FN T1 T2 IV NTSR µ 𝑈𝐴(𝜇) 𝑈𝑅(𝜇) 
Panel 1: Quarterly    (𝜏𝐵,𝑄
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 1 and 3 bins were used for IV)             
1 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 2 1 0 41 11 0.92 0 0.75 0 0.6 0.01 0.08 
2 CFNAI: THREE MONTH MOVING AVERAGE 1.13 2 0 41 10 0.83 0 0.62 0 0.2 0.01 0.17 
3 SRISK FROM VLAB 0.02 8 16 25 4 0.33 0.39 0.59 0.59 0.8 0.03 0.22 
4 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 2 1 0 41 11 0.92 0 0.58 0 0.6 0.01 0.08 
5 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 2 1 0 41 11 0.92 0 0.58 0 0.6 0.01 0.08 
6 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.55 3 6 35 9 0.75 0.15 0.54 0.59 0.7 0.01 0.04 
7 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.02 6 21 20 6 0.5 0.51 0.51 1.02 0.8 -0.02 -0.1 
8 CFNAI: PRODUCTION AND INCOME 1.29 0 1 40 12 1 0.02 0.51  0.7 -0.01 -0.04 
9 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.05 0 3 38 12 1 0.07 0.5  0.7 -0.02 -0.11 
10 CFNAI: DIFFUSION INDEX 0.48 4 6 35 8 0.67 0.15 0.49 0.44 0.7 0.02 0.12 
11 LEADING INDEX FOR THE US 0.2 3 10 31 9 0.75 0.24 0.49 0.98 0.7 -0.02 -0.11 
12 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.55 3 0 41 9 0.75 0 0.48 0 0.3 0.02 0.25 
13 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.89 5 2 39 7 0.58 0.05 0.48 0.12 0.7 0.05 0.35 
14 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.74 1 0 41 11 0.92 0 0.45 0 0.6 0.01 0.08 
15 CFNAI: EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND HOURS 1.31 1 0 41 11 0.92 0 0.45 0 0.6 0.01 0.08 
16 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.85 4 1 40 8 0.67 0.02 0.44 0.07 0.7 0.05 0.3 
17 CFNAI: SALES, ORDERS, AND INVENTORIES 0.63 2 6 35 10 0.83 0.15 0.44 0.88 0.7 -0.01 -0.05 
18 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.34 7 7 34 5 0.42 0.17 0.43 0.29 0.8 0.05 0.34 
19 ST LOUIS FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.46 2 2 39 10 0.83 0.05 0.43 0.29 0.7 0.02 0.1 
20 KAMAKURA'S TROUBLED COMPANY INDEX 2 0 0 41 12 1 0 0.43  0.7 0 0 
21 KANSAS CITY FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.28 3 5 36 9 0.75 0.12 0.4 0.49 0.7 0.01 0.07 
22 CFNAI: PERSONAL CONSUMPTION AND HOUSING 0.18 3 7 34 9 0.75 0.17 0.39 0.68 0.7 0 0 
23 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 2 0 0 41 12 1 0 0.28  0.7 0 0 
Panel 2: Monthly      (𝜏𝐵,𝑀
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 0.6 and 3 bins were used for IV)             
1 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.24 8 5 124 25 0.76 0.04 0.71 0.16 0.8 0.03 0.19 
2 KAMAKURA'S TROUBLED COMPANY INDEX 0.12 9 23 106 24 0.73 0.18 0.59 0.65 0.8 0.01 0.08 
3 LEADING INDEX FOR THE US 0.18 7 28 101 26 0.79 0.22 0.58 1.02 0.8 0 -0.02 
4 CFNAI: DIFFUSION INDEX 0.3 8 29 100 25 0.76 0.22 0.56 0.93 0.8 0 0 
5 CFNAI: THREE MONTH MOVING AVERAGE 0.22 6 24 105 27 0.82 0.19 0.54 1.02 0.8 0 -0.02 
6 CFNAI: PRODUCTION AND INCOME 0.69 7 30 99 26 0.79 0.23 0.54 1.1 0.8 -0.01 -0.04 
7 CFNAI: PERSONAL CONSUMPTION AND HOUSING 0.46 7 19 110 26 0.79 0.15 0.53 0.69 0.8 0.01 0.05 
8 ST LOUIS FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.18 10 6 123 23 0.7 0.05 0.51 0.15 0.8 0.04 0.24 
9 KANSAS CITY FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.1 14 20 109 19 0.58 0.16 0.51 0.37 0.8 0.04 0.26 
10 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.3 11 18 111 22 0.67 0.14 0.51 0.42 0.8 0.03 0.18 
11 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.22 7 12 117 26 0.79 0.09 0.5 0.44 0.8 0.02 0.1 
12 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 2 0 0 129 33 1 0 0.5  0.4 0 0 
13 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 2 0 0 129 33 1 0 0.5  0.4 0 0 
14 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.18 12 17 112 21 0.64 0.13 0.49 0.36 0.8 0.03 0.22 
15 CFNAI: SALES, ORDERS, AND INVENTORIES 1.56 6 15 114 27 0.82 0.12 0.49 0.64 0.8 0.01 0.05 
16 CFNAI: EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND HOURS 0.36 11 26 103 22 0.67 0.2 0.47 0.6 0.8 0.02 0.12 
17 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.42 10 17 112 23 0.7 0.13 0.46 0.43 0.8 0.02 0.16 
18 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.38 5 24 105 28 0.85 0.19 0.46 1.23 0.8 -0.01 -0.05 
19 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.2 9 20 109 24 0.73 0.16 0.44 0.57 0.8 0.02 0.1 
20 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.28 8 20 109 25 0.76 0.16 0.44 0.64 0.8 0.01 0.07 
21 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.2 9 11 118 24 0.73 0.09 0.42 0.31 0.8 0.03 0.17 
22 SRISK FROM VLAB 0.1 8 11 118 25 0.76 0.09 0.42 0.35 0.8 0.02 0.14 
23 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 2 0 0 129 33 1 0 0.35  0.4 0 0 
Panel 3: Weekly      (𝜏𝐵,𝑊
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 0.3 and 4 bins were used for IV)             
1 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.04 51 116 413 127 0.71 0.22 0.64 0.77 0.7 0 0.01 
2 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.02 71 93 436 107 0.6 0.18 0.58 0.44 0.7 0.03 0.17 
3 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.02 87 159 370 91 0.51 0.3 0.58 0.61 0.7 0.02 0.11 
4 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.06 51 92 437 127 0.71 0.17 0.56 0.61 0.7 0.01 0.07 
5 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.18 52 82 447 126 0.71 0.16 0.5 0.53 0.7 0.02 0.09 
6 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.18 41 92 437 137 0.77 0.17 0.5 0.76 0.7 0 0.01 
7 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.02 75 151 378 103 0.58 0.29 0.49 0.68 0.7 0.01 0.06 
8 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.26 41 89 440 137 0.77 0.17 0.49 0.73 0.7 0 0.02 
9 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.02 96 150 379 82 0.46 0.28 0.47 0.53 0.7 0.03 0.18 
10 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.14 49 86 443 129 0.72 0.16 0.44 0.59 0.7 0.01 0.07 
11 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.28 31 85 444 147 0.83 0.16 0.43 0.92 0.7 -0.01 -0.03 
12 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 2 0 0 529 178 1 0 0.43  0.3 0 0 
13 ST LOUIS FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.04 64 91 438 114 0.64 0.17 0.42 0.48 0.7 0.02 0.14 
14 SRISK FROM VLAB 0.04 43 65 464 135 0.76 0.12 0.3 0.51 0.7 0.01 0.09 
Panel 4: Daily      (𝜏𝐵,𝐷
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 0.1 and 4 bins were used for IV)             
1 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.04 127 297 3896 640 0.83 0.07 0.54 0.43 0.8 0.01 0.07 
2 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.12 102 290 3903 665 0.87 0.07 0.53 0.52 0.8 0 0.04 
3 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.28 94 317 3876 673 0.88 0.08 0.52 0.62 0.8 0 0.02 
4 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.08 111 38 4155 656 0.86 0.01 0.51 0.06 0.8 0.02 0.13 
5 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.14 141 246 3947 626 0.82 0.06 0.51 0.32 0.8 0.01 0.1 
6 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.18 147 290 3903 620 0.81 0.07 0.51 0.36 0.8 0.01 0.1 
7 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.02 63 284 3909 704 0.92 0.07 0.51 0.82 0.8 0 -0.01 
8 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.28 35 1 4192 732 0.95 0 0.5 0.01 0.8 0.01 0.05 
9 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.12 110 275 3918 657 0.86 0.07 0.47 0.46 0.8 0.01 0.05 
10 SRISK FROM VLAB 0.08 56 108 4085 711 0.93 0.03 0.45 0.35 0.8 0 0.04 
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Table 5 
Comparison of financial stress indices’ ability to signal stress based on the imbalance level and 
maximization of Usefulness. 
 
Name 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑙𝑒𝑣 TP FP TN FN T1 T2 IV NTSR µ 𝑈𝐴(𝜇) 𝑈𝑅(𝜇) 
Panel 1: Quarterly    (𝜏𝐵,𝑄
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 1 and 3 bins were used for IV)             
1 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.61 12 4 34 4 0.25 0.11 0.34 0.14 0.7 0.13 0.64 
2 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.73 12 4 34 4 0.25 0.11 0.54 0.14 0.7 0.13 0.64 
3 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.94 9 2 36 7 0.44 0.05  0.09 0.7 0.11 0.51 
4 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.65 11 7 31 5 0.31 0.18 0.46 0.27 0.7 0.1 0.5 
5 CFNAI: PERSONAL CONSUMPTION AND HOUSING 1.06 9 4 34 7 0.44 0.11 0.04 0.19 0.7 0.09 0.46 
6 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.05 7 3 35 9 0.56 0.08 0.18 0.18 0.7 0.07 0.36 
7 CFNAI: DIFFUSION INDEX 0.67 8 6 32 8 0.5 0.16 0.23 0.32 0.7 0.07 0.34 
8 SRISK FROM VLAB 0.62 9 9 29 7 0.44 0.24 0.6 0.42 0.7 0.07 0.32 
9 CFNAI: THREE MONTH MOVING AVERAGE 0.85 6 3 35 10 0.63 0.08 0.38 0.21 0.7 0.06 0.29 
10 CFNAI: EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND HOURS 0.89 6 3 35 10 0.63 0.08 0.38 0.21 0.7 0.06 0.29 
11 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 1.21 5 1 37 11 0.69 0.03 0.74 0.08 0.7 0.06 0.29 
12 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.23 5 1 37 11 0.69 0.03 0.13 0.08 0.7 0.06 0.29 
13 ST LOUIS FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.64 6 3 35 10 0.63 0.08  0.21 0.7 0.06 0.29 
14 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.5 6 4 34 10 0.63 0.11  0.28 0.7 0.06 0.27 
15 LEADING INDEX FOR THE US 0.74 6 4 34 10 0.63 0.11 0.41 0.28 0.7 0.06 0.27 
16 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.86 5 2 36 11 0.69 0.05 0.77 0.17 0.7 0.05 0.26 
17 CFNAI: PRODUCTION AND INCOME 1.14 5 2 36 11 0.69 0.05 0.17 0.17 0.7 0.05 0.26 
18 KAMAKURA'S TROUBLED COMPANY INDEX 0.83 7 7 31 9 0.56 0.18 0.59 0.42 0.7 0.05 0.25 
19 KANSAS CITY FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.61 5 3 35 11 0.69 0.08  0.25 0.7 0.05 0.23 
20 CFNAI: SALES, ORDERS, AND INVENTORIES 1.48 4 1 37 12 0.75 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.7 0.05 0.22 
21 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.8 5 4 34 11 0.69 0.11 0.04 0.34 0.7 0.04 0.21 
22 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.55 6 10 28 10 0.63 0.26 0.32 0.7 0.7 0.02 0.11 
23 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 2 0 0 38 16 1 0 0.31  0.1 0 0 
Panel 2: Monthly      (𝜏𝐵,𝑀
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 1 and 3 bins were used for IV)             
1 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.67 31 10 105 17 0.35 0.09 0.32 0.13 0.7 0.11 0.56 
2 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.64 33 14 101 15 0.31 0.12 0.78 0.18 0.7 0.12 0.56 
3 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.65 31 15 100 17 0.35 0.13 0.75 0.2 0.7 0.11 0.51 
4 ST LOUIS FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.5 26 11 104 22 0.46 0.1 0.78 0.18 0.7 0.09 0.44 
5 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.53 32 28 87 16 0.33 0.24 0.87 0.37 0.7 0.09 0.42 
6 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 1.11 19 1 114 29 0.6 0.01 0.32 0.02 0.7 0.08 0.39 
7 CFNAI: EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND HOURS 0.62 23 11 104 25 0.52 0.1 0.31 0.2 0.7 0.08 0.38 
8 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.5 21 8 107 27 0.56 0.07 0.83 0.16 0.7 0.08 0.37 
9 CFNAI: DIFFUSION INDEX 0.56 25 19 96 23 0.48 0.17 0.38 0.32 0.7 0.07 0.35 
10 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.5 19 6 109 29 0.6 0.05 0.25 0.13 0.7 0.07 0.34 
11 KANSAS CITY FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.52 20 11 104 28 0.58 0.1 0.87 0.23 0.7 0.07 0.32 
12 SRISK FROM VLAB 0.79 23 20 95 25 0.52 0.17 0.51 0.36 0.7 0.06 0.3 
13 CFNAI: PERSONAL CONSUMPTION AND HOUSING 1.12 19 12 103 29 0.6 0.1 0.06 0.26 0.7 0.06 0.29 
14 KAMAKURA'S TROUBLED COMPANY INDEX 0.5 23 21 94 25 0.52 0.18 1.74 0.38 0.7 0.06 0.29 
15 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.83 16 7 108 32 0.67 0.06 0.07 0.18 0.7 0.06 0.27 
16 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.71 17 9 106 31 0.65 0.08 0.03 0.22 0.7 0.06 0.27 
17 LEADING INDEX FOR THE US 0.53 20 16 99 28 0.58 0.14 0.54 0.33 0.7 0.06 0.27 
18 CFNAI: THREE MONTH MOVING AVERAGE 0.97 14 5 110 34 0.71 0.04 0.5 0.15 0.7 0.05 0.25 
19 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.33 13 4 111 35 0.73 0.03 0.1 0.13 0.7 0.05 0.24 
20 CFNAI: SALES, ORDERS, AND INVENTORIES 0.52 20 22 93 28 0.58 0.19 0.31 0.46 0.7 0.05 0.22 
21 CFNAI: PRODUCTION AND INCOME 0.65 15 18 97 33 0.69 0.16 0.19 0.5 0.7 0.03 0.15 
22 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.53 18 31 84 30 0.63 0.27 0.78 0.72 0.7 0.02 0.1 
23 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 2 0 0 115 48 1 0 0.1  0.6 0 0 
Panel 3: Weekly      (𝜏𝐵,𝑊
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 1.2 and 4 bins were used for IV)             
1 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.52 136 83 444 45 0.25 0.16 0.59 0.21 0.7 0.1 0.55 
2 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.62 128 72 455 53 0.29 0.14 1.07 0.19 0.7 0.1 0.54 
3 ST LOUIS FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.5 106 48 479 75 0.41 0.09 0.86 0.16 0.7 0.08 0.47 
4 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.71 114 70 457 67 0.37 0.13 1.07 0.21 0.7 0.08 0.46 
5 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.5 97 36 491 84 0.46 0.07 1.43 0.13 0.7 0.08 0.45 
6 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.5 83 29 498 98 0.54 0.06 0.43 0.12 0.7 0.07 0.39 
7 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.52 128 139 388 53 0.29 0.26 1.17 0.37 0.7 0.07 0.38 
8 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 1.06 75 19 508 106 0.59 0.04 0.58 0.09 0.7 0.07 0.37 
9 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.8 71 30 497 110 0.61 0.06 0.08 0.15 0.7 0.06 0.32 
10 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.5 74 50 477 107 0.59 0.09 0.22 0.23 0.7 0.05 0.29 
11 SRISK FROM VLAB 0.89 85 77 450 96 0.53 0.15 0.45 0.31 0.7 0.05 0.29 
12 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.94 75 62 465 106 0.59 0.12 0.24 0.28 0.7 0.05 0.27 
13 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.98 10 5 522 171 0.94 0.01 0.08 0.17 0.7 0.01 0.04 
14 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 2 0 0 527 181 1 0 0.25  0.1 0 0 
Panel 4: Daily      (𝜏𝐵,𝐷
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 1.2 and 4 bins were used for IV)             
1 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.52 1027 501 3047 386 0.27 0.14 0.38 0.19 0.7 0.11 0.57 
2 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.58 942 523 3025 471 0.33 0.15 1 0.22 0.7 0.1 0.51 
3 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.71 842 449 3099 571 0.4 0.13 0.85 0.21 0.7 0.09 0.46 
4 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.5 698 212 3336 715 0.51 0.06 1.16 0.12 0.7 0.09 0.43 
5 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.52 978 875 2673 435 0.31 0.25 0.77 0.36 0.7 0.09 0.43 
6 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.97 602 171 3377 811 0.57 0.05 0.59 0.11 0.7 0.07 0.37 
7 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.8 507 204 3344 906 0.64 0.06 0.13 0.16 0.7 0.06 0.3 
8 SRISK FROM VLAB 0.91 605 502 3046 808 0.57 0.14 0.27 0.33 0.7 0.06 0.28 
9 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.94 558 421 3127 855 0.61 0.12 0.25 0.3 0.7 0.05 0.27 
10 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.79 376 688 2860 1037 0.73 0.19 0.51 0.73 0.7 0.01 0.06 
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Table 6 
Comparison of financial stress indices’ ability to signal stress based on the differenced imbalance 
and maximization of Usefulness. 
 
Name 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑙𝑒𝑣 TP FP TN FN T1 T2 IV NTSR µ 𝑈𝐴(𝜇) 𝑈𝑅(𝜇) 
Panel 1: Quarterly    (𝜏𝐵,𝑄
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 1 and 3 bins were used for IV)             
1 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.08 10 12 29 2 0.17 0.29 1.11 0.35 0.8 0.08 0.51 
2 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.51 8 5 36 4 0.33 0.12 0.2 0.18 0.7 0.08 0.49 
3 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.22 8 5 36 4 0.33 0.12 0.48 0.18 0.7 0.08 0.49 
4 CFNAI: THREE MONTH MOVING AVERAGE 0.04 10 16 25 2 0.17 0.39 1.32 0.47 0.8 0.06 0.41 
5 CFNAI: EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND HOURS 0.2 8 8 33 4 0.33 0.2 0.6 0.29 0.8 0.06 0.41 
6 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.46 6 3 38 6 0.5 0.07 0.1 0.15 0.7 0.06 0.39 
7 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.04 9 13 28 3 0.25 0.32 1.39 0.42 0.8 0.06 0.39 
8 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.02 8 10 31 4 0.33 0.24 1.11 0.37 0.8 0.06 0.37 
9 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.16 8 10 31 4 0.33 0.24 1.31 0.37 0.8 0.06 0.37 
10 ST LOUIS FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.14 7 6 35 5 0.42 0.15 0.3 0.25 0.7 0.06 0.37 
11 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.1 6 4 37 6 0.5 0.1 0.42 0.2 0.7 0.06 0.36 
12 CFNAI: PRODUCTION AND INCOME 0.24 9 15 26 3 0.25 0.37 1.16 0.49 0.8 0.05 0.34 
13 SRISK FROM VLAB 0.04 8 11 30 4 0.33 0.27 1.12 0.4 0.8 0.05 0.34 
14 CFNAI: DIFFUSION INDEX 0.73 4 0 41 8 0.67 0 0.35 0 0.3 0.02 0.33 
15 KAMAKURA'S TROUBLED COMPANY INDEX 0.06 7 8 33 5 0.42 0.2 0.58 0.33 0.8 0.05 0.32 
16 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.02 8 13 28 4 0.33 0.32 1.55 0.48 0.8 0.05 0.29 
17 KANSAS CITY FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.06 6 8 33 6 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.39 0.8 0.03 0.22 
18 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.2 6 10 31 6 0.5 0.24 1.16 0.49 0.8 0.03 0.17 
19 CFNAI: SALES, ORDERS, AND INVENTORIES 1.15 2 1 40 10 0.83 0.02 0.03 0.15 0.7 0.02 0.13 
20 CFNAI: PERSONAL CONSUMPTION AND HOUSING 0.36 2 2 39 10 0.83 0.05 0.09 0.29 0.7 0.02 0.1 
21 LEADING INDEX FOR THE US 1.29 1 0 41 11 0.92 0 0.09 0 0.5 0.01 0.08 
22 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 2 0 0 41 12 1 0 0.32  0.7 0 0 
23 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 2 0 0 41 12 1 0 0.28  0.7 0 0 
Panel 2: Monthly      (𝜏𝐵,𝑀
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 0.6 and 3 bins were used for IV)             
1 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.08 17 15 114 16 0.48 0.12 0.77 0.23 0.8 0.06 0.39 
2 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.12 20 31 98 13 0.39 0.24 1.15 0.4 0.8 0.06 0.36 
3 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.16 15 12 117 18 0.55 0.09 0.24 0.2 0.8 0.06 0.35 
4 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.08 19 30 99 14 0.42 0.23 1.15 0.4 0.8 0.05 0.33 
5 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.12 16 20 109 17 0.52 0.16 0.46 0.32 0.8 0.05 0.32 
6 ST LOUIS FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.04 18 28 101 15 0.45 0.22 1.22 0.4 0.8 0.05 0.32 
7 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.04 21 44 85 12 0.36 0.34 1.4 0.54 0.8 0.05 0.29 
8 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.2 16 26 103 17 0.52 0.2 0.66 0.42 0.8 0.04 0.27 
9 KANSAS CITY FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.06 16 26 103 17 0.52 0.2 0.72 0.42 0.8 0.04 0.27 
10 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.06 17 31 98 16 0.48 0.24 0.98 0.47 0.8 0.04 0.26 
11 SRISK FROM VLAB 0.06 14 25 104 19 0.58 0.19 0.77 0.46 0.8 0.03 0.22 
12 CFNAI: SALES, ORDERS, AND INVENTORIES 0.67 15 35 94 18 0.55 0.27 1.16 0.6 0.8 0.03 0.17 
13 CFNAI: PERSONAL CONSUMPTION AND HOUSING 0.04 20 57 72 13 0.39 0.44 1.08 0.73 0.8 0.02 0.16 
14 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.18 11 22 107 22 0.67 0.17 0.44 0.51 0.8 0.02 0.15 
15 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.61 6 3 126 27 0.82 0.02 0.04 0.13 0.7 0.02 0.14 
16 CFNAI: EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND HOURS 0.4 11 23 106 22 0.67 0.18 0.35 0.53 0.8 0.02 0.14 
17 KAMAKURA'S TROUBLED COMPANY INDEX 0.14 9 17 112 24 0.73 0.13 0.31 0.48 0.8 0.02 0.12 
18 CFNAI: PRODUCTION AND INCOME 1.8 4 4 125 29 0.88 0.03 0.07 0.26 0.8 0.01 0.07 
19 CFNAI: THREE MONTH MOVING AVERAGE 0.3 5 10 119 28 0.85 0.08 0.09 0.51 0.8 0.01 0.05 
20 LEADING INDEX FOR THE US 0.3 5 11 118 28 0.85 0.09 0.06 0.56 0.8 0.01 0.05 
21 CFNAI: DIFFUSION INDEX 0.53 4 9 120 29 0.88 0.07 0.05 0.58 0.8 0 0.03 
22 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 2 0 0 129 33 1 0 0.11  0.1 0 0 
23 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 2 0 0 129 33 1 0 0.35  0.1 0 0 
Panel 3: Weekly      (𝜏𝐵,𝑊
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 0.3 and 4 bins were used for IV)             
1 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.1 51 30 499 127 0.71 0.06 0.12 0.2 0.7 0.04 0.21 
2 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.04 48 38 491 130 0.73 0.07 0.2 0.27 0.7 0.03 0.18 
3 ST LOUIS FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.06 54 53 476 124 0.7 0.1 0.14 0.33 0.7 0.03 0.18 
4 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.1 45 34 495 133 0.75 0.06 0.11 0.25 0.7 0.03 0.17 
5 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.04 56 77 452 122 0.69 0.15 0.41 0.46 0.7 0.02 0.13 
6 SRISK FROM VLAB 0.06 38 36 493 140 0.79 0.07 0.12 0.32 0.7 0.02 0.13 
7 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.16 58 90 439 120 0.67 0.17 0.52 0.52 0.7 0.02 0.11 
8 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.26 27 27 502 151 0.85 0.05 0.09 0.34 0.7 0.02 0.09 
9 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.12 30 36 493 148 0.83 0.07 0.17 0.4 0.7 0.01 0.08 
10 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.34 38 59 470 140 0.79 0.11 0.21 0.52 0.7 0.01 0.07 
11 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.34 20 31 498 158 0.89 0.06 0.1 0.52 0.7 0.01 0.04 
12 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.06 36 72 457 142 0.8 0.14 0.26 0.67 0.7 0.01 0.03 
13 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.34 29 62 467 149 0.84 0.12 0.21 0.72 0.7 0 0.01 
14 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 2 0 0 529 178 1 0 0.43  0.1 0 0 
Panel 4: Daily      (𝜏𝐵,𝐷
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 0.1 and 4 bins were used for IV)             
1 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.02 390 627 3566 377 0.49 0.15 1.46 0.29 0.8 0.04 0.3 
2 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.04 293 312 3881 474 0.62 0.07 0.62 0.19 0.8 0.03 0.28 
3 SRISK FROM VLAB 0.02 250 500 3693 517 0.67 0.12 0.92 0.37 0.8 0.02 0.16 
4 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.02 378 1064 3129 389 0.51 0.25 1.79 0.51 0.8 0.02 0.15 
5 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0 420 1282 2911 347 0.45 0.31 2.14 0.56 0.8 0.02 0.13 
6 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.02 227 594 3599 540 0.7 0.14 1.01 0.48 0.8 0.01 0.1 
7 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.06 209 628 3565 558 0.73 0.15 1.04 0.55 0.8 0.01 0.07 
8 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.02 317 1085 3108 450 0.59 0.26 1.84 0.63 0.8 0.01 0.06 
9 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0 369 1383 2810 398 0.52 0.33 2.23 0.69 0.8 0 0.03 
10 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.46 47 115 4078 720 0.94 0.03 0.27 0.45 0.8 0 0.02 
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Table 7 
Accuracy of forecasts. 
Name RMSE MAE MAPE 
NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.56 0.36 0.73 
KANSAS CITY FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.64 0.41 0.78 
KAMAKURA'S TROUBLED COMPANY INDEX 0.41 0.3 0.95 
GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.59 0.36 1.02 
LEADING INDEX FOR THE US 1.07 0.61 3.03 
6 SECTOR CFSI 1.7 1.24 3.15 
CFNAI: DIFFUSION INDEX 0.64 0.51 5.02 
BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.84 0.51 5.23 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Evaluation of the Usefulness of a collection of stress measures in sample and out of sample. 
Name 𝜏𝑀,𝑖
𝑙𝑒𝑣 TP FP TN FN T1 T2 IV NTSR µ 𝑈𝑎(𝜇) 𝑈𝑅(𝜇) 
Panel 1: In Sample (1992M05 to 2004M01)             
KAMAKURA'S TROUBLED COMPANY INDEX 1.23 18 4 87 32 0.64 0.04 0.19 0.12 0.6 0.07 0.31 
6 SECTOR CFSI 1.19 16 3 88 34 0.68 0.03 0.13 0.1 0.6 0.06 0.28 
BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 1 19 8 83 31 0.62 0.09 0.06 0.23 0.6 0.06 0.27 
GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.68 17 9 82 33 0.66 0.1 0.19 0.29 0.6 0.05 0.22 
CFNAI: DIFFUSION INDEX 0.62 16 9 82 34 0.68 0.1 0.17 0.31 0.6 0.04 0.2 
LEADING INDEX FOR THE US 0.58 18 14 77 32 0.64 0.15 0.14 0.43 0.6 0.04 0.17 
KANSAS CITY FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 1.04 16 13 78 34 0.68 0.14 0.08 0.45 0.6 0.03 0.15 
NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 1.57 2 0 91 48 0.96 0 0.06 0 0.5 0.01 0.04 
Panel 2: Out of Sample (2004M02 to 2013M12)             
KANSAS CITY FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 1.04 15 4 84 12 0.52 0.05 0.42 0.09 0.6 0.06 0.4 
6 SECTOR CFSI 1.19 11 0 88 15 0.65 0 0.72 0 0.6 0.06 0.35 
KAMAKURA'S TROUBLED COMPANY INDEX 1.23 10 0 88 18 0.68 0 0.19 0 0.6 0.05 0.32 
GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.68 11 2 86 18 0.65 0.02 0.4 0.06 0.6 0.05 0.31 
NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 1.57 9 0 88 13 0.71 0 0.87 0 0.5 0.04 0.29 
BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 1 0 5 83 31 1 0.06 1.06  0.6 -0.02 -0.11 
CFNAI: DIFFUSION INDEX 0.62 6 28 60 28 0.81 0.32 1.98 1.64 0.6 -0.06 -0.41 
LEADING INDEX FOR THE US 0.58 4 28 60 30 0.87 0.32 1.8 2.47 0.6 -0.07 -0.47 
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Appendix A. Robustness testing 
Table A.1 
Comparison of financial stress indices’ ability to signal stress based on the imbalance level and 
optimal IV for the robustness sample. 
 
Name 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑙𝑒𝑣 TP FP TN FN T1 T2 IV NTSR µ 𝑈𝐴(𝜇) 𝑈𝑅(𝜇) 
Panel 1: Quarterly    (𝜏𝐵,𝑄
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 1 and 3 bins were used for IV)             
1 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 2 3 0 68 15 0.83 0  0 0.2 0.01 0.17 
2 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 2 3 1 67 15 0.83 0.01  0.09 0.7 0.02 0.14 
3 KANSAS CITY FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 2 3 1 67 15 0.83 0.01  0.09 0.7 0.02 0.14 
4 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 2 1 3 65 17 0.94 0.04 1.33 0.79 0.7 0 -0.02 
5 CFNAI: DIFFUSION INDEX 2 4 1 67 14 0.78 0.01 0.77 0.07 0.7 0.03 0.2 
6 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.62 8 3 65 10 0.56 0.04 0.73 0.1 0.7 0.05 0.37 
7 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.59 3 14 54 15 0.83 0.21 0.54 1.24 0.8 -0.01 -0.09 
8 CFNAI: PERSONAL CONSUMPTION AND HOUSING 0.94 9 9 59 9 0.5 0.13 0.53 0.26 0.8 0.05 0.34 
9 KAMAKURA'S TROUBLED COMPANY INDEX 1.88 2 2 66 16 0.89 0.03 0.53 0.26 0.7 0.01 0.06 
10 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.68 0 5 63 18 1 0.07 0.53  0.7 -0.02 -0.12 
11 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.09 10 3 65 8 0.44 0.04 0.52 0.08 0.8 0.08 0.49 
12 CFNAI: EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND HOURS 2 3 0 68 15 0.83 0 0.5 0 0.2 0.01 0.17 
13 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.21 11 8 60 7 0.39 0.12 0.5 0.19 0.8 0.07 0.47 
14 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 1.11 3 7 61 15 0.83 0.1 0.49 0.62 0.8 0 0.01 
15 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.8 5 8 60 13 0.72 0.12 0.48 0.42 0.8 0.02 0.12 
16 CFNAI: THREE MONTH MOVING AVERAGE 2 3 0 68 15 0.83 0 0.47 0 0.2 0.01 0.17 
17 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.67 9 9 59 9 0.5 0.13 0.47 0.26 0.8 0.05 0.34 
18 LEADING INDEX FOR THE US 0.95 6 6 62 12 0.67 0.09 0.41 0.26 0.8 0.03 0.21 
19 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.09 5 1 67 13 0.72 0.01 0.35 0.05 0.7 0.04 0.25 
20 CFNAI: SALES, ORDERS, AND INVENTORIES 0.71 5 7 61 13 0.72 0.1 0.22 0.37 0.8 0.02 0.13 
21 CFNAI: PRODUCTION AND INCOME 0.79 5 6 62 13 0.72 0.09 0.19 0.32 0.8 0.02 0.15 
Panel 2: Monthly      (𝜏𝐵,𝑀
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 1 and 3 bins were used for IV)             
1 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 2 4 8 195 53 0.93 0.04 1.35 0.56 0.7 0 0.01 
2 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.39 20 20 183 37 0.65 0.1 0.89 0.28 0.7 0.03 0.2 
3 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.26 31 10 193 26 0.46 0.05 0.74 0.09 0.7 0.07 0.47 
4 KANSAS CITY FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 1.06 16 3 200 41 0.72 0.01 0.61 0.05 0.7 0.04 0.26 
5 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.8 28 9 194 29 0.51 0.04 0.56 0.09 0.7 0.07 0.42 
6 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.06 27 8 195 30 0.53 0.04 0.52 0.08 0.7 0.06 0.41 
7 CFNAI: DIFFUSION INDEX 1.91 12 4 199 45 0.79 0.02 0.51 0.09 0.7 0.03 0.18 
8 CFNAI: EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND HOURS 1.47 12 5 198 45 0.79 0.02 0.5 0.12 0.7 0.03 0.17 
9 CFNAI: THREE MONTH MOVING AVERAGE 1.26 14 9 194 43 0.75 0.04 0.5 0.18 0.7 0.03 0.18 
10 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.62 19 31 172 38 0.67 0.15 0.5 0.46 0.7 0.02 0.1 
11 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.65 21 35 168 36 0.63 0.17 0.5 0.47 0.8 0.02 0.12 
12 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.52 13 49 154 44 0.77 0.24 0.5 1.06 0.8 -0.02 -0.11 
13 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 2 0 4 199 57 1 0.02 0.5  0.7 0 -0.03 
14 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.52 23 16 187 34 0.6 0.08 0.49 0.2 0.7 0.04 0.28 
15 LEADING INDEX FOR THE US 1.45 11 8 195 46 0.81 0.04 0.49 0.2 0.7 0.02 0.13 
16 CFNAI: PERSONAL CONSUMPTION AND HOUSING 1.02 22 26 177 35 0.61 0.13 0.49 0.33 0.7 0.03 0.19 
17 KAMAKURA'S TROUBLED COMPANY INDEX 1.98 5 6 197 52 0.91 0.03 0.49 0.34 0.7 0.01 0.04 
18 CFNAI: PRODUCTION AND INCOME 0.52 23 38 165 34 0.6 0.19 0.48 0.46 0.8 0.02 0.14 
19 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.5 27 27 176 30 0.53 0.13 0.47 0.28 0.8 0.04 0.28 
20 CFNAI: SALES, ORDERS, AND INVENTORIES 0.85 16 27 176 41 0.72 0.13 0.44 0.47 0.7 0.01 0.08 
21 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.11 14 5 198 43 0.75 0.02 0.08 0.1 0.7 0.03 0.21 
Panel 3: Weekly      (𝜏𝐵,𝑊
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 1.2 and 4 bins were used for IV)             
1 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 2 6 17 891 217 0.97 0.02 1.19 0.7 0.8 0 0.01 
2 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.88 111 40 868 112 0.5 0.04 0.66 0.09 0.8 0.07 0.45 
3 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.97 127 51 857 96 0.43 0.06 0.64 0.1 0.8 0.08 0.51 
4 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 2 0 19 889 223 1 0.02 0.58  0.8 0 -0.02 
5 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 2 16 28 880 207 0.93 0.03 0.55 0.43 0.8 0.01 0.04 
6 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.32 106 42 866 117 0.52 0.05 0.53 0.1 0.8 0.07 0.43 
7 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.7 82 114 794 141 0.63 0.13 0.5 0.34 0.8 0.04 0.24 
8 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 1 45 136 772 178 0.8 0.15 0.5 0.74 0.8 0.01 0.05 
9 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.74 88 70 838 135 0.61 0.08 0.49 0.2 0.8 0.05 0.32 
10 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.89 75 83 825 148 0.66 0.09 0.49 0.27 0.8 0.04 0.24 
11 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.5 87 108 800 136 0.61 0.12 0.48 0.3 0.8 0.04 0.27 
12 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 1.98 43 5 903 180 0.81 0.01 0.43 0.03 0.8 0.03 0.19 
Panel 4: Daily      (𝜏𝐵,𝐷
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 1.2 and 4 bins were used for IV)             
1 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.82 1086 1096 5025 708 0.39 0.18 0.89 0.3 0.8 0.06 0.36 
2 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 2 0 132 5989 1794 1 0.02 0.54 65535 0.7 -0.01 -0.03 
3 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.59 804 675 5446 990 0.55 0.11 0.51 0.25 0.7 0.05 0.29 
4 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.77 902 340 5781 892 0.5 0.06 0.5 0.11 0.7 0.07 0.42 
5 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.73 1122 548 5573 672 0.37 0.09 0.5 0.14 0.7 0.08 0.49 
6 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.09 958 560 5561 836 0.47 0.09 0.5 0.17 0.7 0.06 0.4 
7 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.88 147 251 5870 1647 0.92 0.04 0.5 0.5 0.7 0 0.02 
8 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.82 607 675 5446 1187 0.66 0.11 0.49 0.33 0.7 0.03 0.18 
9 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.5 627 729 5392 1167 0.65 0.12 0.36 0.34 0.7 0.03 0.18 
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Table A.2 
Comparison of financial stress indices’ ability to signal stress based on the differenced imbalance 
and optimal IV for the robustness sample. 
 
Name 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑙𝑒𝑣 TP FP TN FN T1 T2 IV NTSR µ 𝑈𝐴(𝜇) 𝑈𝑅(𝜇) 
Panel 1: Quarterly    (𝜏𝐵,𝑄
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 1 and 3 bins were used for IV)             
1 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 2 1 0 68 16 0.94 0 0.89 0 0.2 0 0.06 
2 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.64 3 2 66 14 0.82 0.03 0.79 0.17 0.8 0.02 0.15 
3 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.7 3 0 68 14 0.82 0 0.6 0 0.2 0.01 0.18 
4 CFNAI: PERSONAL CONSUMPTION AND HOUSING 0.16 4 15 53 13 0.76 0.22 0.57 0.94 0.8 0 0.01 
5 KAMAKURA'S TROUBLED COMPANY INDEX 0.14 6 13 55 11 0.65 0.19 0.55 0.54 0.8 0.03 0.16 
6 CFNAI: DIFFUSION INDEX 0.42 5 12 56 12 0.71 0.18 0.55 0.6 0.8 0.02 0.12 
7 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.36 10 11 57 7 0.41 0.16 0.54 0.28 0.8 0.07 0.43 
8 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.34 6 7 61 11 0.65 0.1 0.54 0.29 0.8 0.04 0.25 
9 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.77 2 10 58 15 0.88 0.15 0.54 1.25 0.8 0 -0.03 
10 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.16 7 8 60 10 0.59 0.12 0.53 0.29 0.8 0.05 0.29 
11 CFNAI: SALES, ORDERS, AND INVENTORIES 0.61 5 12 56 12 0.71 0.18 0.53 0.6 0.8 0.02 0.12 
12 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.61 3 8 60 14 0.82 0.12 0.53 0.67 0.8 0.01 0.06 
13 CFNAI: THREE MONTH MOVING AVERAGE 0.44 4 7 61 13 0.76 0.1 0.52 0.44 0.8 0.02 0.13 
14 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.69 5 1 67 12 0.71 0.01 0.51 0.05 0.8 0.04 0.28 
15 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.65 2 6 62 15 0.88 0.09 0.51 0.75 0.8 0 0.03 
16 KANSAS CITY FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.28 4 9 59 13 0.76 0.13 0.49 0.56 0.8 0.02 0.1 
17 LEADING INDEX FOR THE US 0.28 3 13 55 14 0.82 0.19 0.48 1.08 0.8 0 -0.01 
18 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.57 3 7 61 14 0.82 0.1 0.47 0.58 0.8 0.01 0.07 
19 CFNAI: EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND HOURS 0.55 4 8 60 13 0.76 0.12 0.46 0.5 0.8 0.02 0.12 
20 CFNAI: PRODUCTION AND INCOME 0.95 1 4 64 16 0.94 0.06 0.46 1 0.8 0 0 
21 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.14 2 13 55 15 0.88 0.19 0.39 1.63 0.8 -0.01 -0.07 
Panel 2: Monthly      (𝜏𝐵,𝑀
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 0.6 and 3 bins were used for IV)             
1 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.04 9 47 155 48 0.84 0.23 0.6 1.47 0.8 -0.03 -0.18 
2 CFNAI: EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND HOURS 0.36 16 48 154 41 0.72 0.24 0.57 0.85 0.8 -0.01 -0.05 
3 KAMAKURA'S TROUBLED COMPANY INDEX 0.1 20 38 164 37 0.65 0.19 0.56 0.54 0.8 0.01 0.08 
4 KANSAS CITY FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.12 19 34 168 38 0.67 0.17 0.53 0.5 0.8 0.01 0.08 
5 CFNAI: PERSONAL CONSUMPTION AND HOUSING 0.4 14 40 162 43 0.75 0.2 0.53 0.81 0.8 -0.01 -0.05 
6 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.42 9 13 189 48 0.84 0.06 0.52 0.41 0.7 0.01 0.06 
7 LEADING INDEX FOR THE US 0.18 10 48 154 47 0.82 0.24 0.51 1.35 0.8 -0.03 -0.17 
8 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.48 20 30 172 37 0.65 0.15 0.5 0.42 0.7 0.02 0.13 
9 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.24 18 24 178 39 0.68 0.12 0.49 0.38 0.7 0.02 0.14 
10 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.12 26 38 164 31 0.54 0.19 0.49 0.41 0.8 0.03 0.2 
11 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.3 11 36 166 46 0.81 0.18 0.49 0.92 0.7 -0.01 -0.08 
12 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.1 23 26 176 34 0.6 0.13 0.48 0.32 0.7 0.03 0.21 
13 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.42 20 26 176 37 0.65 0.13 0.48 0.37 0.7 0.02 0.16 
14 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.14 21 36 166 36 0.63 0.18 0.47 0.48 0.8 0.02 0.11 
15 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.26 17 39 163 40 0.7 0.19 0.47 0.65 0.8 0 0.01 
16 CFNAI: SALES, ORDERS, AND INVENTORIES 1.47 10 27 175 47 0.82 0.13 0.47 0.76 0.7 0 -0.03 
17 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.1 14 40 162 43 0.75 0.2 0.47 0.81 0.8 -0.01 -0.05 
18 CFNAI: PRODUCTION AND INCOME 0.79 11 46 156 46 0.81 0.23 0.46 1.18 0.8 -0.02 -0.14 
19 CFNAI: THREE MONTH MOVING AVERAGE 0.24 7 41 161 50 0.88 0.2 0.44 1.65 0.7 -0.03 -0.19 
20 CFNAI: DIFFUSION INDEX 0.34 7 37 165 50 0.88 0.18 0.43 1.49 0.7 -0.02 -0.16 
21 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.12 21 33 169 36 0.63 0.16 0.42 0.44 0.8 0.02 0.12 
Panel 3: Weekly      (𝜏𝐵,𝑊
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 0.3 and 4 bins were used for IV)             
1 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 2 0 0 860 270 1 0   0.3 0 0 
2 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.02 116 198 662 154 0.57 0.23 0.65 0.54 0.7 0.02 0.12 
3 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.06 94 162 698 176 0.65 0.19 0.6 0.54 0.7 0.02 0.09 
4 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.16 56 142 718 214 0.79 0.17 0.52 0.8 0.7 0 -0.02 
5 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.2 46 129 731 224 0.83 0.15 0.52 0.88 0.7 -0.01 -0.03 
6 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.24 66 122 738 204 0.76 0.14 0.51 0.58 0.7 0.01 0.05 
7 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.18 62 157 703 208 0.77 0.18 0.5 0.8 0.7 0 -0.02 
8 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.3 68 146 714 202 0.75 0.17 0.49 0.67 0.7 0 0.02 
9 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.1 60 133 727 210 0.78 0.15 0.48 0.7 0.7 0 0.01 
10 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.08 77 100 760 193 0.71 0.12 0.39 0.41 0.7 0.02 0.13 
11 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.04 73 118 742 197 0.73 0.14 0.38 0.51 0.7 0.01 0.08 
12 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.04 48 114 746 222 0.82 0.13 0.35 0.75 0.7 0 0 
Panel 4: Daily      (𝜏𝐵,𝐷
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 0.1 and 4 bins were used for IV)             
1 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.06 127 427 6392 968 0.88 0.06 0.55 0.54 0.8 0 0.02 
2 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.14 129 461 6358 966 0.88 0.07 0.53 0.57 0.8 0 0.01 
3 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.24 186 364 6455 909 0.83 0.05 0.51 0.31 0.8 0.01 0.09 
4 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.24 111 399 6420 984 0.9 0.06 0.51 0.58 0.8 0 0.01 
5 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.1 116 47 6772 979 0.89 0.01 0.5 0.07 0.8 0.01 0.1 
6 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.1 151 424 6395 944 0.86 0.06 0.5 0.45 0.8 0 0.04 
7 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.2 175 289 6530 920 0.84 0.04 0.47 0.27 0.8 0.01 0.09 
8 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 2 0 0 6819 1095 1 0 0.47  0.6 0 0 
9 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.02 43 211 6608 1052 0.96 0.03 0.3 0.79 0.8 0 -0.01 
  
 Page 31 of 32 
Table A.3 
Comparison of financial stress indices’ ability to signal stress based on the imbalance level and 
maximization of Usefulness for the robustness sample. 
 
Name 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑙𝑒𝑣 TP FP TN FN T1 T2 IV NTSR µ 𝑈𝐴(𝜇) 𝑈𝑅(𝜇) 
Panel 1: Quarterly    (𝜏𝐵,𝑄
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 1 and 3 bins were used for IV)             
1 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.89 15 6 62 3 0.17 0.09  0.11 0.8 0.12 0.74 
2 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.85 13 4 64 5 0.28 0.06 0.37 0.08 0.8 0.1 0.65 
3 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.02 12 9 59 6 0.33 0.13 0.5 0.2 0.8 0.08 0.51 
4 CFNAI: EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND HOURS 0.62 10 5 63 8 0.44 0.07 0.31 0.13 0.8 0.07 0.46 
5 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.82 9 4 64 9 0.5 0.06  0.12 0.8 0.07 0.41 
6 CFNAI: PERSONAL CONSUMPTION AND HOUSING 1.55 9 4 64 9 0.5 0.06 0.25 0.12 0.8 0.07 0.41 
7 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.67 12 16 52 6 0.33 0.24 1.57 0.35 0.8 0.07 0.41 
8 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.83 9 5 63 9 0.5 0.07 0.32 0.15 0.8 0.06 0.4 
9 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.62 8 3 65 10 0.56 0.04 0.73 0.1 0.7 0.05 0.37 
10 LEADING INDEX FOR THE US 0.62 9 7 61 9 0.5 0.1 0.24 0.21 0.8 0.06 0.37 
11 CFNAI: DIFFUSION INDEX 0.53 9 8 60 9 0.5 0.12 0.91 0.24 0.8 0.06 0.35 
12 KANSAS CITY FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.62 8 7 61 10 0.56 0.1  0.23 0.8 0.05 0.31 
13 KAMAKURA'S TROUBLED COMPANY INDEX 0.79 9 11 57 9 0.5 0.16 0.7 0.32 0.8 0.05 0.31 
14 CFNAI: THREE MONTH MOVING AVERAGE 0.53 7 5 63 11 0.61 0.07 0.56 0.19 0.8 0.04 0.28 
15 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 1.24 5 1 67 13 0.72 0.01 0.17 0.05 0.7 0.04 0.25 
16 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.09 5 1 67 13 0.72 0.01 0.35 0.05 0.7 0.04 0.25 
17 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.79 7 8 60 11 0.61 0.12 0.25 0.3 0.8 0.04 0.24 
18 CFNAI: PRODUCTION AND INCOME 1.5 5 2 66 13 0.72 0.03 0.01 0.11 0.7 0.03 0.23 
19 CFNAI: SALES, ORDERS, AND INVENTORIES 1.85 4 1 67 14 0.78 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.7 0.03 0.2 
20 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.5 4 12 56 14 0.78 0.18 0.82 0.79 0.8 0 0 
21 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.98 3 11 57 15 0.83 0.16 0.3 0.97 0.8 -0.01 -0.04 
Panel 2: Monthly      (𝜏𝐵,𝑀
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 1 and 3 bins were used for IV)             
1 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.56 46 38 165 11 0.19 0.19 1.32 0.23 0.8 0.09 0.6 
2 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.56 40 24 179 17 0.3 0.12 0.64 0.17 0.8 0.09 0.55 
3 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.73 33 16 187 24 0.42 0.08 0.64 0.14 0.7 0.07 0.46 
4 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.67 36 42 161 21 0.37 0.21 1.11 0.33 0.8 0.06 0.38 
5 CFNAI: EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND HOURS 0.5 31 26 177 26 0.46 0.13 0.56 0.24 0.8 0.06 0.36 
6 CFNAI: DIFFUSION INDEX 0.56 29 24 179 28 0.49 0.12 0.62 0.23 0.8 0.05 0.33 
7 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 1.11 19 1 202 38 0.67 0 0.05 0.01 0.7 0.05 0.33 
8 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.71 22 7 196 35 0.61 0.03 0.24 0.09 0.7 0.05 0.33 
9 LEADING INDEX FOR THE US 0.5 28 22 181 29 0.51 0.11 0.4 0.22 0.7 0.05 0.33 
10 KANSAS CITY FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.5 28 27 176 29 0.51 0.13 1.07 0.27 0.8 0.05 0.3 
11 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.5 32 53 150 25 0.44 0.26 2.01 0.47 0.8 0.04 0.25 
12 CFNAI: PERSONAL CONSUMPTION AND HOUSING 1.58 19 12 191 38 0.67 0.06 0.19 0.18 0.7 0.04 0.24 
13 CFNAI: THREE MONTH MOVING AVERAGE 0.53 20 15 188 37 0.65 0.07 0.5 0.21 0.7 0.04 0.24 
14 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.76 17 9 194 40 0.7 0.04 0.06 0.15 0.7 0.04 0.23 
15 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.15 15 7 196 42 0.74 0.03 0.25 0.13 0.7 0.03 0.21 
16 KAMAKURA'S TROUBLED COMPANY INDEX 1.17 22 23 180 35 0.61 0.11 0.49 0.29 0.7 0.03 0.21 
17 CFNAI: SALES, ORDERS, AND INVENTORIES 0.64 22 30 173 35 0.61 0.15 0.35 0.38 0.8 0.03 0.16 
18 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.77 19 24 179 38 0.67 0.12 0.31 0.35 0.7 0.02 0.15 
19 CFNAI: PRODUCTION AND INCOME 0.55 23 36 167 34 0.6 0.18 0.42 0.44 0.8 0.02 0.15 
20 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.5 16 36 167 41 0.72 0.18 1.07 0.63 0.8 0 0.01 
21 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 2 5 16 187 52 0.91 0.08 0.04 0.9 0.7 -0.01 -0.03 
Panel 3: Weekly      (𝜏𝐵,𝑊
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 1.2 and 4 bins were used for IV)             
1 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.56 158 126 782 65 0.29 0.14 1.19 0.2 0.8 0.09 0.57 
2 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.52 143 93 815 80 0.36 0.1 0.92 0.16 0.8 0.08 0.54 
3 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.85 152 141 767 71 0.32 0.16 1.19 0.23 0.8 0.08 0.52 
4 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.5 156 224 684 67 0.3 0.25 1.32 0.35 0.8 0.07 0.45 
5 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.52 110 64 844 113 0.51 0.07 0.37 0.14 0.8 0.07 0.42 
6 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.5 110 127 781 113 0.51 0.14 0.85 0.28 0.8 0.06 0.35 
7 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.7 77 53 855 146 0.65 0.06 0.18 0.17 0.8 0.05 0.29 
8 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.73 89 121 787 134 0.6 0.13 0.69 0.33 0.8 0.04 0.26 
9 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.67 85 117 791 138 0.62 0.13 0.5 0.34 0.8 0.04 0.25 
10 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.52 108 261 647 115 0.52 0.29 1.63 0.59 0.8 0.03 0.19 
11 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.52 61 163 745 162 0.73 0.18 1.37 0.66 0.8 0.01 0.09 
12 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.62 53 156 752 170 0.76 0.17 0.61 0.72 0.8 0.01 0.06 
Panel 4: Daily      (𝜏𝐵,𝐷
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 1.2 and 4 bins were used for IV)             
1 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.73 1122 548 5573 672 0.37 0.09 0.5 0.14 0.7 0.08 0.49 
2 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.5 1070 595 5526 724 0.4 0.1 0.63 0.16 0.7 0.07 0.45 
3 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.55 1249 1348 4773 545 0.3 0.22 0.82 0.32 0.8 0.07 0.42 
4 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.5 1199 1472 4649 595 0.33 0.24 0.97 0.36 0.8 0.06 0.37 
5 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.67 775 532 5589 1019 0.57 0.09 0.37 0.2 0.7 0.05 0.3 
6 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.71 563 344 5777 1231 0.69 0.06 0.15 0.18 0.7 0.04 0.23 
7 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 1.11 475 240 5881 1319 0.74 0.04 0.27 0.15 0.7 0.03 0.21 
8 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.5 919 1715 4406 875 0.49 0.28 1.17 0.55 0.8 0.02 0.15 
9 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.61 388 865 5256 1406 0.78 0.14 0.91 0.65 0.7 0 0.01 
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Table A.4 
Comparison of financial stress indices’ ability to signal stress based on the differenced imbalance 
and maximization of Usefulness for the robustness sample. 
 
Name 𝜏𝐹,𝑖
𝑙𝑒𝑣 TP FP TN FN T1 T2 IV NTSR µ 𝑈𝐴(𝜇) 𝑈𝑅(𝜇) 
Panel 1: Quarterly    (𝜏𝐵,𝑄
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 1 and 3 bins were used for IV)             
1 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.36 12 14 54 5 0.29 0.21 1.22 0.29 0.8 0.08 0.5 
2 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.16 12 16 52 5 0.29 0.24 1.51 0.33 0.8 0.08 0.47 
3 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.48 9 5 63 8 0.47 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.8 0.07 0.46 
4 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.1 10 11 57 7 0.41 0.16 0.54 0.28 0.8 0.07 0.43 
5 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.18 12 20 48 5 0.29 0.29 1.97 0.42 0.8 0.07 0.41 
6 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.06 12 21 47 5 0.29 0.31 1.75 0.44 0.8 0.06 0.4 
7 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.14 8 9 59 9 0.53 0.13 0.53 0.28 0.8 0.05 0.34 
8 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.02 11 22 46 6 0.35 0.32 1.72 0.5 0.8 0.05 0.32 
9 CFNAI: THREE MONTH MOVING AVERAGE 0.26 9 16 52 8 0.47 0.24 0.96 0.44 0.8 0.05 0.29 
10 CFNAI: PRODUCTION AND INCOME 0.28 11 25 43 6 0.35 0.37 1.11 0.57 0.8 0.04 0.28 
11 CFNAI: EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND HOURS 0.24 8 14 54 9 0.53 0.21 0.65 0.44 0.8 0.04 0.26 
12 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.34 8 14 54 9 0.53 0.21 0.62 0.44 0.8 0.04 0.26 
13 KANSAS CITY FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.08 8 15 53 9 0.53 0.22 0.68 0.47 0.8 0.04 0.25 
14 KAMAKURA'S TROUBLED COMPANY INDEX 0.26 6 7 61 11 0.65 0.1 0.11 0.29 0.8 0.04 0.25 
15 CFNAI: DIFFUSION INDEX 0.67 5 4 64 12 0.71 0.06 0.04 0.2 0.8 0.04 0.24 
16 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.22 7 16 52 10 0.59 0.24 0.88 0.57 0.8 0.03 0.18 
17 CFNAI: SALES, ORDERS, AND INVENTORIES 1.15 3 1 67 14 0.82 0.01 0 0.08 0.8 0.03 0.16 
18 CFNAI: PERSONAL CONSUMPTION AND HOUSING 0.44 2 2 66 15 0.88 0.03 0.03 0.25 0.8 0.01 0.09 
19 LEADING INDEX FOR THE US 0.32 3 6 62 14 0.82 0.09 0.05 0.5 0.8 0.01 0.09 
20 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.26 6 20 48 11 0.65 0.29 1.2 0.83 0.8 0.01 0.06 
21 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 2 0 0 68 17 1 0 0.34  0.1 0 0 
Panel 2: Monthly      (𝜏𝐵,𝑀
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 0.6 and 3 bins were used for IV)             
1 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.12 30 43 159 27 0.47 0.21 0.79 0.4 0.8 0.04 0.25 
2 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.22 30 45 157 27 0.47 0.22 0.77 0.42 0.8 0.04 0.24 
3 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.04 36 72 130 21 0.37 0.36 1.18 0.56 0.8 0.04 0.23 
4 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.04 31 54 148 26 0.46 0.27 1.19 0.49 0.8 0.03 0.22 
5 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.12 26 38 164 31 0.54 0.19 0.49 0.41 0.8 0.03 0.2 
6 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.1 29 49 153 28 0.49 0.24 0.96 0.48 0.8 0.03 0.2 
7 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.18 20 22 180 37 0.65 0.11 0.2 0.31 0.7 0.03 0.19 
8 KANSAS CITY FINANCIAL STRESS INDEX 0.26 14 9 193 43 0.75 0.04 0.06 0.18 0.7 0.03 0.18 
9 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.36 9 4 198 48 0.84 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.7 0.02 0.13 
10 KAMAKURA'S TROUBLED COMPANY INDEX 0.12 20 32 170 37 0.65 0.16 0.38 0.45 0.7 0.02 0.11 
11 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0 32 82 120 25 0.44 0.41 1.11 0.72 0.8 0.02 0.1 
12 CFNAI: PRODUCTION AND INCOME 1.96 6 4 198 51 0.89 0.02 0.11 0.19 0.7 0.01 0.08 
13 CFNAI: SALES, ORDERS, AND INVENTORIES 1.84 10 13 189 47 0.82 0.06 0.13 0.37 0.7 0.01 0.08 
14 CFNAI: PERSONAL CONSUMPTION AND HOUSING 1.43 2 2 200 55 0.96 0.01 0.01 0.28 0.7 0 0.02 
15 CFNAI: THREE MONTH MOVING AVERAGE 0.51 3 4 198 54 0.95 0.02 0.03 0.38 0.7 0 0.02 
16 CFNAI: EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND HOURS 2 1 0 202 56 0.98 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.02 
17 LEADING INDEX FOR THE US 0.51 2 2 200 55 0.96 0.01 0.06 0.28 0.7 0 0.02 
18 CFNAI: DIFFUSION INDEX 0.69 2 4 198 55 0.96 0.02 0 0.56 0.7 0 0.01 
19 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.63 6 13 189 51 0.89 0.06 0.09 0.61 0.7 0 0.01 
20 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 2 0 0 202 57 1 0 0.11  0.1 0 0 
21 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 2 0 0 202 57 1 0 0.01  0.1 0 0 
Panel 3: Weekly      (𝜏𝐵,𝑊
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 0.3 and 4 bins were used for IV)             
1 NATIONAL FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.04 83 79 781 187 0.69 0.09 0.22 0.3 0.7 0.03 0.18 
2 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.12 65 60 800 205 0.76 0.07 0.09 0.29 0.7 0.02 0.15 
3 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.08 77 100 760 193 0.71 0.12 0.39 0.41 0.7 0.02 0.13 
4 NFCI: LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 0.04 73 118 742 197 0.73 0.14 0.38 0.51 0.7 0.01 0.08 
5 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.16 96 181 679 174 0.64 0.21 0.78 0.59 0.7 0.01 0.07 
6 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.42 54 93 767 216 0.8 0.11 0.23 0.54 0.7 0.01 0.05 
7 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.12 54 96 764 216 0.8 0.11 0.26 0.56 0.7 0.01 0.05 
8 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.57 11 7 853 259 0.96 0.01 0.05 0.2 0.7 0 0.03 
9 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.4 12 12 848 258 0.96 0.01 0.05 0.31 0.7 0 0.03 
10 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.24 50 104 756 220 0.81 0.12 0.2 0.65 0.7 0 0.02 
11 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.06 26 55 805 244 0.9 0.06 0.13 0.66 0.7 0 0.01 
12 NFCI: NONFINANCIAL LEVERAGE SUBINDEX 2 0 0 860 270 1 0   0.3 0 0 
Panel 4: Daily      (𝜏𝐵,𝐷
𝑙𝑒𝑣 = 0.1 and 4 bins were used for IV)             
1 GOLDMAN SACHS FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.02 520 972 5847 575 0.53 0.14 1.61 0.3 0.8 0.03 0.25 
2 BLOOMBERG FINANCIAL CONDITIONS INDEX 0.04 443 805 6014 652 0.6 0.12 1.06 0.29 0.8 0.02 0.22 
3 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.1 345 826 5993 750 0.68 0.12 1.04 0.38 0.8 0.01 0.13 
4 EQUITY MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.12 335 846 5973 760 0.69 0.12 1.02 0.41 0.8 0.01 0.11 
5 SECURITIZATION MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.14 99 194 6625 996 0.91 0.03 0.3 0.31 0.8 0.01 0.05 
6 FX MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.42 53 131 6688 1042 0.95 0.02 0.28 0.4 0.8 0 0.02 
7 FUNDING MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.02 333 1225 5594 762 0.7 0.18 1.54 0.59 0.8 0 0.02 
8 CREDIT MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.24 60 182 6637 1035 0.95 0.03 0.29 0.49 0.8 0 0.01 
9 RE MARKET FROM 6 SECTOR CFSI 0.04 7 23 6796 1088 0.99 0 0.16 0.53 0.8 0 0 
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